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Abstract: This study contributes to a small literature on the dynamics of informal care by 
examining the informal care provision choices of working age Australians. We focus on the 
impact of previous work characteristics (including work security and flexibility) on 
subsequent care provision decisions and distinguish between care that is provided to people 
who cohabit and people who reside elsewhere, as well as between the provision of care as the 
primary caregiver, or in a secondary caring role. Our dynamic framework of informal care 
provision accounts for state-dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. For 
both males and females, we find the existence of positive state-dependence in all care states 
in both the short- and medium-term. Furthermore, the inertia in care provision appears to be 
stronger for more intensive care. We also find previous employment status has a significant 
deterrent effect on current care provision decisions. The effects on employment, however, 
differ according to the type of previous work, the type of care currently provided, and the 
gender of the caregiver. We also find that workers with perceptions of greater job security are 
nevertheless less likely to provide subsequent care. Our results also suggest that workers’ 
perceptions about work flexibility and their stated overall satisfaction with work actually 
have no impact on their subsequent decisions to provide care in any capacity. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large extant multidisciplinary literature on caregiving and the relationship between 
the provision of informal care—especially eldercare—on labour force participation (LFP), 
productivity and earnings.1 Most of that literature does not, however, consider the dynamics 
that are associated with caregiving and labour market decision-making processes. Indeed, the 
literature on dynamics and caregiving is extremely small, as is documented by Sovinsky and 
Stern’s (2016) recent, thoroughgoing review.  
As Sovinsky and Stern (2016) argue, there are numerous reasons this evidence gap should be 
addressed. First, the decision-making processes themselves are likely inherently dynamic: 
human capital accumulation in respect of care provision; work-related human capital 
depreciation due to extended periods out of the labour force; carer burnout; the declining 
health status of those for whom care is provided, as well as (potentially) for carers; spending 
down of wealth (e.g., to qualify for state subsidies for long-term care) and so on, are 
processes with dynamic effects that may affect decision-making. For instance, the difficulty 
of returning to the labour force is likely to be an increasing function of time away from it, and 
caring may become easier or harder with time depending upon whether learning is involved 
or the health of the care recipient declines with time (Michaud et al., 2010). Second, one 
should beware that ignoring dynamics could also cause one to estimate other parameters with 
bias, rendering policy analyses based on them flawed (Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Sovinsky 
and Stern, 2016).  
As the population ages and policy-makers consider ways to improve the workforce 
participation of specific groups (e.g., older women), understanding the dynamics of informal 
care and labour force participation is of increasing importance. Distinguishing true dynamic 
effects from unobserved heterogeneity, in particular, and determining the precise nature of 
dynamic effects, will provide relevant empirical insights in this regard. For instance, how 
much of the persistence that may be observed in caregiving is due to pure state dependence 
(i.e., the effect of the present state on the future “environment, preferences or technology” 
(Sovinsky and Stern, 2016, p 464), how much of it is due to true duration dependence (e.g., 
due to human capital accumulation or depreciation), and how much is attributable simply to 
unobserved heterogeneity? By controlling appropriately for initial conditions and unobserved 
1 For recent discussions of that literature see, e.g. the reviews contained in Sovinsky and Stern (2016) and 
Nguyen and Connelly (2014). 
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heterogeneity, measures of true state dependence may be retrieved from work of the kind 
presented here. 
In this paper, we present estimates of the first dynamic models of informal care provision for 
working age Australians. In our empirical work, we also recognize the possible differences in 
caregiving patterns between males and females by analysing males and females separately. In 
addition, we employ more detailed classifications of informal care provision and labour 
market outcomes than have generally been used in the international literature to date. Another 
novel aspect of the work is our use of indicators that represent perceived job security and 
flexibility in order to assess the impact of previous work characteristics on future decisions to 
provide care. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such contribution to the literature. 
The work reported in this paper uses panel data drawn from seven waves of the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and employs a dynamic 
multinomial framework that accounts for state-dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and 
initial conditions. We find strong evidence of positive state-dependence in all care provision 
states. We find that care provision is persistent for both males and females in the short- and 
the medium-term and that this persistence appears to be stronger for more intensive types of 
care. In addition, we find that caregiving is employment state-dependent: previous 
employment status does affect caregiving choices in subsequent periods. The impact varies, 
though, according to the type of previous work, type of subsequent care, and the carer’s 
gender. We find that workers with perceptions of better job security are actually less likely to 
be care providers in subsequent years. Workers’ perceptions about the flexibility of work and 
their overall work satisfaction have no apparent influence on their subsequent decisions to 
provide care in this dataset. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the data and presents some descriptive statistics. The 
empirical models are then introduced in Section 4, and in Section 5 we present the results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
Three different strands of the literature are particularly relevant to this study. The first deals 
with the decision to provide care for others. Theoretically, the motivations for informal 
caregiving can be classified into a taxonomy of altruism (Becker, 1974), exchange (Bernheim 
et al., 1985; Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992) and demonstration (Cox and Stark, 1996) 
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motives, or some mixture of these three. Although most empirical studies do not seek to test 
hypotheses that pertain to these supposed motivations2 they do shed some light on the factors 
that drive informal caregiving decisions. For example, individuals with higher incomes are 
less likely to become caregivers (Couch et al., 1999; Mentzakis et al., 2009; Carmichael et 
al., 2010) due to the higher opportunity cost of time. The question of whether or not previous 
work experience per se affects the probability of providing care is equivocal: some empirical 
studies suggest that previous work experience lowers the probability of care provision 
(Mentzakis et al., 2009; Carmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et al., 2010) while others (Stern, 
1995; Berecki-Gisolf et al., 2008) do not.  
A number of studies in the long-term care literature have focused on the dynamics of long-
term care arrangements. For instance, Borsch-Supan et al. (1992) study the dynamics of 
living arrangements of the U.S. elderly. Similarly, Dostie and Léger (2005) examine the 
transitions of living arrangements of sick, elderly individuals in the U.S.; while Gardner and 
Gilleskie (2012) estimate a dynamic model of long-term care arrangements, assets/gift 
behaviour, health insurance benefits, and health transitions for a sample of the U.S. elderly. 
Goeree et al. (2012) estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using U.S. data.  So 
far, all U.S. studies in this literature appear to focus on the long-term care arrangements of 
elderly which are arguably most closely related to the demand side of long-term care.  
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have focused on the supply side factors in 
unpaid care markets—which is the primary focus of the current paper. Both of those studies 
use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Mentzakis et al., 2009; Michaud 
et al., 2010). Mentzakis et al. (2009) employ a random-effects dynamic model to analyse the 
dynamics of care provision by males and females in the U.K. They focus on caring for 
residential spouses and children and use a two-part model to distinguish care participation 
and the levels of care provided. Similarly, using a framework that deals with unobserved 
heterogeneity and state-dependence, Michaud et al. (2010) examine the dynamics of informal 
care provision and employment outcomes for females in the U.K.  
The second and rather rich literature deals with the impact of informal caregiving on 
caregivers’ labour force participation (LFP). Most studies have found evidence of a negative 
correlation between informal care and LFP. However, the magnitude of the negative 
2 Two U.S. studies by Brown (2006) and Norton et al. (2013) are exceptions. They both document that children 
who provide care to their elderly parents are more likely to receive financial transfers from the parents than 
children who do not provide care. 
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correlation varies across studies, ranging from an almost negligible effect  (Van Houtven et 
al., 2013) to a 42 percentage point reduction (Heitmueller, 2007) in the LFP rate. The 
existing literature has also uncovered significant heterogeneity of the effect of informal care 
on LFP: specifically, the impact appears to be stronger for intensive caregivers (Carmichael 
and Charles, 2003; Lilly et al., 2010; Casado-Marín et al., 2011; Nguyen and Connelly, 2013) 
or residential caregivers (Ettner, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Heitmueller, 2007; 
Casado-Marín et al., 2011; Nguyen and Connelly, 2013). 
The third line of literature examines the impact of workplace flexibility on care provision and 
work retention decisions. In spite of the policy interest in promoting flexible working, little is 
known about the extent to which workplace flexibility actually affects care provision 
decisions. Studies have so far focused on samples of employees and have produced quite 
mixed results. For example, Pavalko and Henderson (2006) document that, among employed 
U.S. females who started providing care, people in jobs which offer more flexible working 
hours or more generous job benefits (as measured by unpaid family leave or paid sick or 
vacation days) were more likely to remain employed and maintain their work hours over a 
two-year period. Similarly, Bryan (2012) uses cross-sectional British employee data and 
shows that workers in more flexible jobs are more likely to provide care. By contrast, using 
British cross-sectional data, which contain retrospective information about informal care and 
employment, Henz (2006) shows that starting caregiving is not affected by work flexibility.3  
Some related studies have recently suggested that work flexibility may have some impact on 
employees’ future work and care decisions. Zuba and Schneider (2012), for instance, use 
cross-sectional employee data from Europe to show that employees who provide informal 
care exhibit higher levels of perceived work–family conflict than workers who do not provide 
informal care. Similarly, using a cross-sectional sample of Austrian employees, Schneider et 
al. (2013) show that female employees with more flexible work arrangements are less likely 
to report that they intend to change jobs when facing a demand for informal care provision. If 
work and informal care are substitutable and job change intentions are good proxies for actual 
job changes, the finding by Schneider et al. (2013) may be interpreted as showing that job 
flexibility facilitates future care provision.   
3 Unfortunately, since there is no direct information about job flexibility in the data Henz (2006) has to use 
aggregate measures which were derived using socio-economic class. As Henz (2006) notes, these derived 




                                                   
In summary, there are several strands of literature that are germane to the work presented in 
this paper. The previous empirical work in this field does not provide conclusive evidence on 
the effect of, for instance, flexible work arrangements on employees’ decisions to provide 
care. It is also difficult to draw a causal interpretation from the correlation between work 
characteristics and care provision decisions from some of these studies: many have had to use 
on cross-sectional data, and hence have been unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
or with the problems associated with the strong possibility of selection into work or care. Our 
panel data and ability to implement a dynamic framework enables us to account for state-
dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. These advantages of the data 
and empirical framework implemented in the current paper enable us to draw robust 
inferences regarding the causal impact of previous work characteristics (including job 
security and flexibility) on subsequent decisions to provide care. 
3. Data and descriptive analyses 
3.1. Data 
This study utilises the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey, a nationally representative household-based panel survey which began in 2001. There 
are approximately 7,000 households and 13,000 individuals who respond in each wave. 
HILDA contains rich information on household formation, income and work. We use Waves 
5 to 11 since these seven waves contain the detailed information on informal care that is 
required for our work.4 
3.2. Sample 
For this study, we restrict the sample to individuals aged between 24 and 64, excluding 
individuals at school or undertaking other full-time study. We thus obtain a balanced sample 
which consists of 5,427 unique individuals.5 From these individuals, we exclude a further 
1,581 individuals on the basis that they entail missing information on important variables.6 
4 We do not use Waves 1 to 4 since no direct information about informal care is available in these waves. 
5 A balanced sample is required as we use the Wooldridge (2005) approach to account for the initial conditions 
problem (Wooldridge, 2005, p 44). Using a balanced sample of individuals who are observed at every year over 
the seven year period also helps improve the performance of the Wooldridge (2005) approach as found in the 
literature (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009; Akay, 2012). 
6 Most of missing information is due to variables describing demand for care (See Section 4 for details). 
Information on these variables is derived from a mail-back self-completed questionnaire. About 90 % of 
respondents returned this questionnaire. For these variables we lose 1,568 unique observations mostly because 
respondents did not return a self-completed questionnaire. See Appendix Table A1 for variable description. 
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Thus, we have a balanced sample of 3,846 unique individuals, 54 % (2,058) of whom are 
female. 
There are several reasons that individuals may enter or exit the final sample, including 
original sample attrition, missing information on important variables, and the fact that we 
must observe an individual over the whole period to apply our empirical econometric models. 
While reasons for original sample attrition are discussed elsewhere (Watson, 2012), we 
investigated whether our sample selection criteria led to sample selection issues. One 
particular concern relating to our research design is that caregiving status may affect the 
probability that an individual is included in the final sample. Therefore, we ran a probit 
model where the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is in our sample and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables are basic demographic characteristics, including 
caregiving variables. Regression results (reported in Appendix Table A5) suggest some 
evidence of statistically significant selection on some observables. For example, individuals 
in our sample tended to be older, native, better educated, married, healthier, wealthier, or to 
have healthier family members. However, the pseudo-R2 values are small, indicating that 
selection on observable characteristics is quantitatively weak. More importantly, 𝑝𝑝-values 
from a 𝑡𝑡 test for statistical significance of the caregiving variables included in the regression 
are greater than 0.60, alleviating concern that our results may be driven by sample selection. 
3.3. Definition of unpaid caregiving intensity  
In our data, informal caregivers are individuals who provide unpaid assistance with activities 
of daily living to a person who requires care due to a long-term health condition, old age or 
disability. We first follow Michaud et al. (2010) to identify care provision by residency status 
between the caregiver and care recipient, classifying caregivers as either “resident” caregivers 
or “non-resident” caregivers.7 In addition, our dataset contains further information about 
caregivers: namely, whether or not the caregiver identifies as the primary caregiver.8 We 
classify caregivers who answer “yes” to the question “Are you the main carer of [this 
7 A small number of individuals (comprising less than 0.5 % of our sample) reports providing care for both 
residents and non-residents at the same time. Because resident care is more intensive than non-resident care 
(Nguyen and Connelly, 2014) we classify these individuals as resident caregivers. Similarly, when defining care 
provision by care intensity we assign them as main caregivers if they indicate that that provide care for either 
residents or non-residents as main carers. The results however are not sensitive to the exclusion of these 
individuals from our sample. 
8 Theoretically, care provision can be identified by both residency and intensity. However, in practice, 
transitions between some care groups (for example, among those identified as secondary resident caregivers in 
the previous year, none of them switched to provide care for non-residents (either as main or secondary 
caregivers) in the following year) are not large enough for us to estimate a dynamics model of care provision.  
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person]?” as the “main caregiver” (or, the “main carer”), while those who answer “no” are 
classified “secondary caregivers”.9 Previous studies using data from the U.K. (Carmichael 
and Charles, 2003), Canada (Lilly et al., 2010) and Australia (Nguyen and Connelly, 2014) 
have found this measure of care intensity to be robust and reliable. Our data (see Appendix 
Table A2) also show that, on average, as compared to secondary caregivers, main caregivers 
appear to spend more weekly hours on care and are more likely to receive carer benefits 
(either in the form of a Carer Payment or Carer Allowance). 
In our sample, 8.1 % of respondents are defined as informal carers. In addition, caregiving is 
divided almost equally between residents (4.1 %) and non-residents (4.0 %). By gender, 
females are more likely to report being caregivers (9.9 %) than males (6.3 %). More than a 
half (53 %) of caregivers identified themselves as the main caregiver, with more females (59 
%) than males (43 %) identifying as such. In addition, caregivers are much more likely to 
indicate that they are the main caregiver when they co-habit with the care recipients (74 %) 
than when they do not co-habit with them (33 %). 
 [Table 1 about here] 
The data in Table 1 also show that most care (in total, approximately 89 %) is provided to 
immediate family members (spouse/partner: 16 %, parents (own or in-law): 51 %; or 
children: 22 %). In addition, much more care is provided for immediate family members in 
residential (approximately 97 %) than non-residential care (approximately 81 %). Care 
provided by residential caregivers is distributed fairly evenly between the partners, parents 
and children. By contrast, most care provided by non-residential caregivers is provided to 
parents (77 %). 
3.4. Caregiving transition 
Table 2 presents data on caregiving states, disaggregated by gender and by our two indicators 
of caregiving intensity: Panel A of Table 2 classifies caregivers according to whether they 
reside with the people they care for and Panel B classifies caregivers according to whether or 
9 While this is not well modelled in extant informal care theories, we borrow from labour supply theory here: 
individuals choose between providing care or not then, conditional on providing care, individuals decide the 
intensity of care provision. Empirical models also distinguish intensity of care where possible (Carmichael and 
Charles, 2003; Lilly et al., 2010; Nguyen and Connelly, 2014). Whether or not the decision to provide care as a 
primary or secondary carer, contingent on the need for care, is a “choice”—in the traditional sense—is another 
question that, unfortunately, is largely philosophical, because the datasets that have been available to conduct 
research of the kind reported here do not contain information that could be used to test hypotheses of this kind. 
Indeed, it is likely that different data—likely collected using qualitative and/or psychometric methods—would 




                                                   
not they are classified as the main, or a secondary caregiver. The rows in Table 2 show 
previous caregiving states and the columns of the table present subsequent caregiving states. 
The data in both Panel A and Panel B show a strong degree of observed inertia among non-
carers since approximately 96 % (97 %) of female (male) non-caregivers in the previous year 
remained non-carers in the current year. We do, however, observe significant transitions 
among the caregiving states for caregivers. In particular, for females, while most of the 
resident caregivers resumed their caregiving role in the subsequent year (65 %), 32 % of them 
became non-carers, and 2.3 % switched to providing care for non-residents. Also, for 
females, non-resident caregiving appears to be less stable as only about 48 % remained in 
their previous caregiving role while 50 % became non-carers. The same transition pattern is 
observed for males. However as compared to female caregivers, a higher proportion of male 
caregivers became non-carers in the subsequent year: 39 % who reported being residential 
caregivers and 65 % who reported being non-residential caregivers in the previous period 
became non-caregivers in the subsequent period.  
[Table 2 about here] 
When care intensity is measured according to the main or secondary caregiving roles, we also 
observe the highest level of inertia among non-caregivers, followed by those classified as the 
main caregivers and secondary caregivers. As compared to the resident/non-resident care 
classification, with this care intensity classification we observe qualitatively similar 
proportions of caregivers becoming non-carers and lower proportions of caregivers resuming 
their caregiving roles in the subsequent year (male secondary caregivers are the exception). 
The lower proportions of caregivers resuming their caregiving roles in the subsequent year 
are consistent with the observation that more previous caregivers switched between the main 
and secondary caregiving roles in the subsequent year. These descriptive data on transitions 
between caregiving states appear to be large enough for us to proceed to empirical models of 
caregiving dynamics in order to make statistical inferences on the dynamics of caregiving 
intensity. 
4. Empirical model and econometric method 
4.1. Theoretical background of care provision dynamics 
There are theoretical reasons to characterise informal care provision as an intrinsically-
dynamic process. Some theoretical work (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Engers and Stern, 
2002; Byrne et al., 2009; Rainer and Siedler, 2009) in the long-term care literature uses game 
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theory to model the interaction between siblings who make decisions about long-term care 
for their elderly parents. If the stages of decisions are viewed as sequential, as opposed to 
simultaneous, these theoretical models imply that decisions to provide care are made 
dynamically (Fevang et al., 2012; Skira, 2015). As discussed in Sovinsky and Stern (2016), 
there are several other scenarios where previous care status is taken into account when future 
care provision decisions are made. For example, the costs associated with changing care 
arrangements may cause the current caregivers to continue to provide care in the future. In 
addition, the human capital associated with providing care may cause current caregivers to 
resume their caregiving roles in the next period because the longer they provide care, the 
better they become at doing so (due, e.g. to the accumulation of care-specific human capital). 
Alternatively, individuals who choose to provide care at some point may also have to leave 
work or reduce the hours worked as a consequence, and may face a lower probability of 
obtaining jobs offers in the next period due to labour market human capital depreciation 
(Skira, 2012). Finally, the existence of a “burnout” effect  experienced by caregivers who 
provide care for a long period of time could cause them to exit providing care in the future 
(Seltzer and Li, 2000). These theoretical grounds suggest that the sign of the state dependence 
in care provision could be positive or negative: thus, its determination is an empirical matter. 
4.2. Econometric models 
The outcome rules for the decisions to work and to care may be written, following Michaud 
et al. (2010), as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼(𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1,𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) > 0)   (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼(𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1,𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) > 0)   (2) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 and 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 represent the decisions to work and to care, respectively, at time t; and 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿  
and 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶  are the utility differences between working and not working, and caring and not 
caring, respectively. Note that both of these functions include past work and past care 
decisions, as well as an index, 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡, of the demand for care from the potential care recipient at 
time t, and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡, which represents the characteristics of the potential caregiver at time t. Note 
that, technically, the resulting reduced form equations that are estimated represent an 
approximation to the solution of a dynamic model (Keane and Wolpin 2002).10 
10 It would be better to model labour market and informal care giving activities simultaneously as some 
theoretical models suggest (Keane and Wolpin 2002). However, doing so requires one to find enough plausible 
instruments to identify the system of the labour supply and care giving equations. In particular, one needs to find 
at least two instruments: one instrument that only affects the labour supply equation and the other one that only 
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In our empirical model, caregiving status is defined by J  mutually exclusive states )3( =J . 
The latent value for care status 𝑗𝑗 of individual 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 is presented as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is a vector containing individual observed characteristics with unknown 
parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . We follow the prior literature (Stern, 1995; Mentzakis et al., 2009; 
Carmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et al., 2010) and use previous labour market states (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) 
as explanatory variables in an attempt to limit the prospect of the endogeneity of labour 
market status in the caregiving equations. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of past care 
status (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) allows past caregiving choices to affect current caregiving choices, thus 
reflecting the true dynamic characteristics of care provision (Dostie and Léger, 2005; 
Mentzakis et al., 2009; Michaud et al., 2010; Gardner and Gilleskie, 2012). Individual-
specific time-variant unobserved heterogeneity such as preferences over caregiving and 
labour market attachment are captured by 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = αij + uijt), in which uijt(αij) is time-
(in)variant unobserved heterogeneity.  
As we are estimating dynamic models, we need to deal with the initial conditions problem. 
The initial conditions problem arises because the caregiving states that arose before the first 
observed time period in the panel cannot be known and because the state observed in the 
initial time period (𝑡𝑡 = 1) cannot be assumed to be random. Rather, it is likely that non-
random unobservable factors are correlated with the initial caregiving states. To account for 
the initial conditions problem, we follow Wooldridge (2005) and include among our 
explanatory variables a vector of (𝐽𝐽 − 1) binary dummy variables indicating initial caregiving 
status (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1) and the average over the sample period of the exogenous time-varying variables (?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖).11 Although Wooldridge (2005) calls for the inclusion of the initial status of care 
provision (the dependent variable), we follow the prior literature in this field (Michaud et al., 
2010; Kohn and Liu, 2013) and include the initial labour market states in our specification.  
Specifically, we specify the distribution of the unobserved individual effects as: 
influences the informal caregiving equation. Unfortunately, we could not find enough suitable/plausible 
instruments in our dataset to do that. Studies in the current literature have reported the same difficulties in 
finding plausible instruments to identify such a system. Therefore, the extant studies (Stern, 1995; Mentzakis et 
al., 2009; Carmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et al., 2010) usually estimate the reduced form equations of the 
informal caregiving status as we have done in this manuscript. 
11 An alternative to the Wooldridge (2005) approach is the Heckman’s reduced form approximation (Heckman, 
1981). Heckman’s approach is computationally more demanding than Wooldridge’s so we apply the latter. In 
addition, Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) and Akay (2012) show that Wooldridge’s method performs equally 
well or even better than the Heckman’s reduced form approximation method, especially when the duration of 
the panel is longer than five waves (as is ours). 
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𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖0 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖2 + ?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖3 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁; 𝑗𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽𝐽)  (4) 
where 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a new unobserved time-invariant individual effect that is assumed to be 
multivariate normally distributed and independent of all the explanatory variables and the 
initial caregiving state. Because this initial caregiving state starts our seven-year time-series, 
the estimates of 𝜑𝜑1 (𝜑𝜑2) also indicate the medium-term persistence of caregiving (labour 
market states). Note that using the Wooldridge method, which includes the average of the 
exogenous time-variant variables, we can also deal with the possible correlation between the 
exogenous variables and unobserved individual-effects (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980). 
Using the Wooldridge method thus helps to further limit the likelihood that previous labour 
market states are endogenous in these care dynamics models. Substituting Equation (4) into 
Equation (3) we get the augmented specification which accounts both for the initial 
conditions and unobserved heterogeneity.  
The observed caregiving status is denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . The individual 𝑖𝑖 chooses the care status 𝑗𝑗 
at time 𝑡𝑡 if and only if 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ > 0 (i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ > 0)). Since we assign caregivers who 
provide both residential and non-residential care as the residential caregivers, each individual 
in our sample therefore can choose only one of three mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive states (𝐽𝐽 = 3): non caregiver, resident caregiver, and non-resident caregiver. We 
therefore can use the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model to model individual choices to provide 
informal care. For identification purposes, we set the state 1=j  (non-caregiver) as the base 
group. All other sets of unknown parameters are estimated in comparison with this base 
group.12 Our dynamic MNL model with random effects is estimated via a maximum 
simulated likelihood (MSL) method using 50 Halton draws for each individual (Train, 
2003).13  
The empirical approach employed here thus controls for random intercepts with time-
invariant components and initial conditions. We also experiment with two empirical model 
specifications: Specification I which does not allow for correlation between errors in two care 
outcome equations and Specification II which does. We apply these two specifications to 
three alternative models: a baseline model (Model 1) which includes previous labour market 
12 Note that our dynamic MNL model with random effects does not exhibit the restrictive assumption of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)  (Revelt and Train, 1998). 
13 We use the mixlogit command in Stata to estimate the model (Haan, 2006). As a robustness check, we 
increased the number of draws from 50 to 100, but this did not change the results appreciably.  
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states as defined above and Model 2 (3) which includes variables explaining the work 
security and flexibility perceptions (overall work satisfaction perceptions). 
4.3. Explanatory variables 
In our model, respondents’ characteristics that are associated with the decision to provide 
care include age (and age-squared), education, marital status and health status.14 Furthermore, 
we use non-labour income and home ownership status to control for any wealth effect on the 
respondent’s care provision decisions. Non-labour income is the sum of the respondent's 
income from sources other than wages, salaries, business income, private pensions, and 
includes the other members' income from all sources. This non-labour income is normalized 
by the square root of household size to adjust for economies of scale in consumption. Home 
ownership is reflected by a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the home that the 
respondent is living in is owned or its mortgage is currently being paid off by any member of 
the household.15 As the country of origin may also play some role in explaining caregiving 
decisions, we also include two dummy variables in all equations for immigrant status. These 
dummy variables reflect whether or not the respondent is an immigrant, and also whether 
immigrants emigrated from an English-speaking background (ESB) or a non-English 
speaking background (NESB).16 We further disaggregate the NESB group by distinguishing 
northern/western Europe from the rest of NESB countries. We additionally include a dummy 
variable that indicates when an individual migrated to Australia as a child which would make 
them more likely to have parents in Australia.17 Household characteristics in the models also 
include the number of co-residing members of various age cohorts. We also control for 
differences in working conditions and formal care across regions by including the regional 
unemployment rate, regional relative socio-economic advantage index, state dummies and a 
rural/urban dummy in the caregiving equations. In addition, throughout the empirical 
analysis, we include a full set of year dummies to control for fluctuations in the formal care 
or labour markets over time. 
14 We do not include work experience which is measured in years the respondent has spent at all paid jobs since 
this variable entails a lot of missing information. See Appendix Table A1 for variable description and summary 
statistics. 
15 We cannot include total net wealth in our model since information on family wealth such as assets and 
liabilities are not available for every wave. 
16 We also experimented with including indigenous/non-indigenous status in the regression. For males, the 
estimation of this variable is very imprecise (i.e. it has large standard errors), suggesting a small number of 
observations having this characteristic. This variable is not significant in all regressions for females. We 
therefore decided to drop it from the final specification. 
17 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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We also include variables that may affect the demand for care such as the health status of 
potential care recipients (any serious personal injury/illness of a relative or family member) 
or the death of a family member (spouse/children/relative) or a close friend.18 These variables 
represent demand-shifters for care for both residents and non-residents.19 
As discussed above, we also include a vector of previous labour market states in the care 
dynamics equations. We distinguish between four different labour market states: full-time 
employment, part-time employment, self-employment and economic inactivity (the 
benchmark group). Previous research has shown that work characteristics typically differ 
according to the nature of employment (Henz, 2006; Origo and Pagani, 2009). Our data, 
which contain respondents’ various self-reported opinions about their jobs also show that the 
three types of employment (full-time, part-time and self-employment), do indeed differ in 
terms of job security, flexibility and benefits.20 See Appendix Table A3 for details. Appendix 
Table A4 also shows that full-time employment is perceived to offer the highest level of job 
security and the most generous workplace entitlements21 (as measured by all variables 
describing the respective work characteristics), followed by part-time employment and self-
employment. By contrast, self-employment offers the highest level of work flexibility, 
following by part-time and full-time employment has the lowest. Our classification of labour 
market status thus captures job security, flexibility and benefits reasonably well. 
Work security and flexibility is then captured directly by using self-reported indicators of job 
security and flexibility. Job security, which measures the probability that an individual will 
keep his or her job, theoretically may affect the decision to provide care in two different (and 
opposite) ways. It may be that individuals with a lower level of work security would be more 
likely to provide care because they face a lower opportunity cost in the labour market 
(Hyslop, 1999; Skira, 2015) (e.g., they may be more likely to be unemployed). Conversely, 
18 We aggregate deaths of spouses, children and relatives because these are rare events in our dataset. 
19 Unfortunately, the panel does not include data that would enable us to control for other factors that may have 
an impact on the decision to provide care, such as whether the respondent’s parents are still alive, geographical 
distance to parents, the number of siblings or the availability of formal care. 
20 Like work status, work characteristics are likely to be endogenous in the caregiving equations. We therefore 
employ the two strategies (i.e. including the lag of work characteristics and controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity via estimating an MNL model with random effects) that were applied for work status per se, to 
address the possible endogeneity of work characteristics in the caregiving equations. 
21 While access to workplace benefits such as special leave for caring for family members or paid maternity 
leave would have an impact on workers’ decision to provide care, we do not include a measure of workplace 
benefits in our model because all available workplace benefit measures entail a lot of missing information. In 
our sample, in each wave, about 20 % of respondents who were asked the relevant work place benefit questions 
responded “Don’t know”. Since we use a balanced panel sample, if we were to include these work benefit 
variables in our models, this would give rise to pair-wise observation dropping, causing a significant loss (>20 
% of the original sample) of data. 
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individuals with lower job security may be more resistant to taking on a caregiving role 
precisely because they may be at greater risk of losing and of not regaining employment. To 
our knowledge, the impact of job security on care provision has not been empirically 
analysed in the extant literature on informal care. Following Bryan (2012) and Henz (2006), 
we include variables representing workplace flexibility in our regressions. Unlike these 
previous studies, though, which use concurrent work characteristics and care decisions, we 
use respondents’ responses to questions about the flexibility of their workplaces as indicators 
of the latent flexibility of the workplace, and measure the effects of these on subsequent care 
choices. Specifically, we use responses to a “job security satisfaction” question to represent 
work security and responses to a “the flexibility to balance work and non-work commitments 
satisfaction” question to proxy for work flexibility for three reasons.22 First, these variables 
are highly correlated with the other measures of work security and flexibility that are 
available to us (See Appendix Table A3). Second, questions about “job security satisfaction” 
and “work and life job satisfaction” were asked for all employed individuals, including self-
employed people, so we do not need to impute information for self-employed individuals. 
Third, these measures entail much less missing information than the alternatives. Finally, in 
addition to these two measures of work security and flexibility, in separate regressions, we 
also include a measure representing “overall job satisfaction” in our model because this 
measure is also highly correlated with work security and flexibility measures (see Appendix 
Table A3). 
Unemployed individuals obviously were not asked the foregoing questions. Following the 
usual practice in the literature dealing with missing information, we use a “dummy variable 
adjustment” method. This method has been proven to be appropriate for cases where the 
unobserved value simply does not exist (Allison, 2001, footnote 5). In our case, job 
characteristics of unemployed individuals do not exist. We implement this method by 
substituting the variable’s mean for all missing cases.23 In addition, we include a dummy 
22 In particular, respondents were told: “I now have some questions about how satisfied or dissatisfied you are 
with different aspects of your job. If not currently employed: These questions refer to the most recent job you 
were working in the last 7 days. I am going to read out a list of different aspects of your job and, using the scale 
on SHOWCARD E36, I want you to pick a number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied 
you are with the following aspects of your job. The more satisfied you are, the higher the number you should 
pick. The less satisfied you are, the lower the number”. 
23 We dropped individuals (about 3 % of the original balanced panel sample) who were employed or self-
employed but had missing information on these variables rather than using the “dummy variable adjustment” 
method because deletion has been found to produce less biased estimates (Allison, 2001). We use the variable’s 
mean for the job characteristic variables of unemployed people for ease of interpretation of the unemployed 
dummy variable as suggested by Allison (2001). The results for work characteristic variables were identical 
when we assigned the lowest value (=0) of work characteristic variables for unemployed individuals.  
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variable coded 1 if the original variable is missing and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is 
also the variable used to describe unemployment status. Thus, estimates of work 
characteristic variables can be interpreted as the effect of, say, work security perceptions 
given that the individuals worked last year; whereas the variable “unemployed last year” 
distinguishes between individuals who did not work last year and had average work security 
perceptions and individuals who worked last year and also had average work security 
perceptions.  
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the estimation results from the dynamics models of care provision 
when care intensity is defined by residency status (sub-section 5.1) and the main/secondary 
roles (defined in sub-section 5.2). Within each sub-section, we discuss the results from some 
model specification tests, following by main results from three alternative models (model 1 
with employment status, model 2 with work security and flexibility indicators, and model 3 
with overall work satisfaction indicators). We also discuss other factors affecting the optimal 
choice over caregiving at the end of each sub-section. 
5.1. Resident versus non-resident care 
5.1.1. Test results 
We first discuss the results obtained for the dynamics of care provision when care intensity is 
defined by residency status between the caregiver and care recipient (Table 3a). The standard 
deviations (SD) of the individual random coefficients which are reported at the lower part of 
Table 3a indicate that unobserved heterogeneity is important in all regressions: they are all 
highly statistically significant. The correlation between errors in the two care outcome 
equations is also reported at the lower part of Table 3a.24 The correlation coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant for males only. This negative correlation suggests that, 
for males, unobserved characteristics that make them more likely to provide non-resident care 
also make them less likely to provide other care. For males, the inclusion of the correlation 
24 While there are three alternatives (non-caregiver, resident caregiver and non-resident caregiver), for 
identification purposes, the MNL model only estimates two equations: resident caregiver (versus non-caregiver) 
and non-resident caregiver (versus non-caregiver). As such, there is only one correlation in errors of the resident 
caregiver and non-resident caregiver equations is estimated and reported. 
15 
 
                                                   
between errors also improves the fit of the model as measured by the Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
test for the error covariance matrix.25 
[Table 3a about here] 
We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) to assess the fit for two specifications. Both criteria aim to 
weight the model fit and the number of parameters, with lower values of the BIC and the AIC 
indicating preferred models. These model selection criteria, reported at the bottom of Table 
3a, favour Specification I for females. By contrast these two model selection criteria are in 
disagreement with respect to the preferred specification of error correlation: the AIC suggests 
that Specification II is preferred while BIC, which imposes a greater penalty for model 
complexity, suggests Specification I. In any event, note that that accounting for error 
correlation does not change the significance of any of the parameter estimates appreciably for 
either males or females.  
5.1.2. Main results 
The results in Table 3a show that, for both females and males, providing care to residents 
rather than providing care to non-residents or providing no care in the previous year increases 
the probability of providing care for residents in the subsequent year.26 Similarly, providing 
care to non-residents rather than providing care to residents or providing no care last year 
increases the probability of providing care for non-residents this year. These results confirm 
the existence of significant positive state-dependence in care status for both males and 
females. Comparing the persistence of resident and non-resident care, we observe that 
25 The (joint) significance of the error correlations can be tested using an LR test. The test statistic, which is Chi-
squared distributed with k degrees of freedom (k= number of error correlation = 1 in our case) is given by 
2*(Log Likelihood of Specification II – Log Likelihood of Specification I). 
26 We focus on the direction of the impact in this paper. However, to get a sense about the magnitude of the 
estimates we report the average marginal effects (AMEs) for main variables (i.e., care provision and labour 
market states). The AMEs, which are expressed as percentage-point differences, were computed by simulating, 
for each individual in the sample, the probability of providing care for a particular state before and after a 
change in the relevant characteristic and then averaging those probabilities over time and over individuals. The 
interpretation of the AMEs is as follows: an AME of 4.99 for the variable “resident care last year” (first row in 
Table 3a) from the female resident care equation (first column) suggests that providing care for residents the 
previous year increases the probability of providing care for residents in the subsequent year by 4.99 percentage 
points. Theoretically, we can use a bootstrapping technique to get the standard errors (and hence the statistical 
significance level) of AMEs. However, it is impractical to do so because we have to run each regression at least 
100 times to get a reasonably reliable estimate of standard errors. In our case, running one regression takes more 
than 6 hours. We therefore assign the statistical significance level of the coefficient estimates to the AMEs. We 
also follow Michaud et al. (2010) to simulate the dynamic effects of care and report the results in Appendix 
Table A12 (for resident/non-resident care) and A13 (for main/secondary care). Consistent with evidence 
provided in the previous UK study by Michaud et al. (2010), our results also suggest the AMEs tend to zero 
within 3 years.   
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resident care is more persistent than non-resident care, a finding which is consistent with the 
U.K. evidence presented in Michaud et al. (2010). 
The presence of state-dependence in care provision is also found in the medium-term. The 
estimates of variables describing initial care states (measured in 2005) show that male and 
female individuals who provided care for residents (non-residents) at the beginning of the 
study period were more likely to provide care for residents (non-residents) in the subsequent 
year. For females, we do not observe switches between caregiving for residents and non-
residents during the study period. For males, though, we do observe switches between caring 
for residents and non-residents. Specifically, males who started the study period as resident 
(non-resident) caregivers are more likely to become non-resident (resident) caregivers in the 
subsequent year. Our finding of the evidence of switching between caring for residents and 
non-residents for Australian males is in line with evidence presented in Michaud et al. (2010) 
for U.K. females. Our results, however, suggest that while inertia in care provision does exist 
for both females and males, it appears to be longer lasting for males. Again, in our study, 
resident care appears to be more persistent than non-resident care in the medium-term for 
both males and females.  
We next turn to the impact of previous employment states on current care decisions. Results 
from Specification I in Table 3a show that, for females, only working on a full-time basis last 
year statistically significantly reduces the probability of providing care (either for residents or 
non-residents) this year. Working in other capacities (i.e. in part-time or self-employment) in 
the previous year does not, however, have any apparent impact on decisions to provide care 
either for residents or non-residents in the current year. Our findings of heterogeneous 
impacts of previous work status on current care provision decisions suggest that the deterrent 
impact of previous work status--as identified by working or not on current care decisions that 
has been found in the literature (Mentzakis et al., 2009; Carmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et 
al., 2010)--may be concentrated among full-time employed females (only).27 By contrast, for 
males (results from Specification I and II in Table 3a), working on any basis last year 
strongly statistically significantly decreased the probability of providing care to residents in 
the subsequent year. Males’ previous work states, however, do not have any statistically 
27 We experimented with defining previous work status by one dummy variable (i.e. working or not) as used in 
the prior studies (Mentzakis et al., 2009; Carmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et al., 2010). Results from this 
experiment show that, for females, working last year only marginally (at the 10 per cent level of statistical 
significance) statistically decreases their probability of providing care for residents this year. In addition, also 
for females, working last year does not have any statistically significant impact on the probability of providing 
care for non-residents this year. 
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significant impact on their decisions to provide care to non-residents in the current year. 
Similarly, for both males and females, initial work status (which is measured in 2005 in our 
data) has a statistically insignificant impact on current decisions to provide care. Males who 
worked part-time in 2005 are the exception: they are less likely (at the 5 % level) to provide 
care for non-residents in the current year.  
5.1.3. Results from alternative models with work characteristics  
Above we found heterogeneous impacts of previous employment states on current care 
provision decisions. As discussed earlier, these heterogeneous impacts may reflect the 
different work characteristics associated with different types of employment. In this section, 
we directly examine which previous work characteristics are driving working respondents to 
provide informal care in subsequent years. We discuss the results from two alternative 
models with direct measures of work characteristics. Results from Model 2, which includes 
indicators representing work security and flexibility perceptions, and Model 3, which controls 
for overall work satisfaction perceptions, are reported in Table 3b and 3c, respectively. The 
test statistics and coefficient estimates in Model 2 and 3 are remarkably similar to those 
presented previously for Model 1. The only noticeable differences are that, for both males 
and females, estimates of the variable explaining the “unemployed” status become 
statistically insignificant in all specifications and models. The insignificant estimates for this 
variable suggest that there is no difference between the previously employed and unemployed 
individuals regarding choices to provide care either for residents or non-residents in the 
subsequent years. Estimates for the “unemployed” variable for males in Model 3 are the 
exception: males who were unemployed last year are marginally more likely (at the 10 per 
cent level) to provide care for residents in the subsequent year than their employed 
counterparts. As discussed in section 4.2, it is possible that the effects of the three types of 
employment (i.e. full-time, part-time and self-employment) differ but that their combined 
impact is to cancel out. 
Controlling for previous work status, we find that, for previously employed males and 
females, work security, flexibility and overall work satisfaction perceptions have no 
statistically significant impact on subsequent decisions to provide care (either for residents or 
non-residents). Estimates on our indicator of job security perceptions (which were measured 
at the beginning of the study period) are, however, negative and statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level in the non-resident care equation for males. Taken at face value, these 
estimates suggest that among males working in the initial year, those who perceived a lower 
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level of job security were actually more likely to provide care for non-residents in the current 
year. 
 [Table 3b and 3c about here] 
5.1.4. Other results 
We next discuss other factors that may affect the optimal choice over caregiving (Appendix 
Table A6). Most of the estimates are as expected. In particular, migrant background plays a 
statistically significant role in explaining the caregiving decisions of males only. Specifically, 
male immigrants from NESB countries outside the northern/western Europe are more likely 
to provide care for non-residents than male Australian-born individuals. In our data, parents 
represent more than three quarters of non-resident care recipients and about half of male 
immigrants are from Asia. Therefore, our finding of a higher probability of providing among 
immigrants from NESB countries outside the northern/western Europe is consistent with an 
often-observed pattern that children, especially sons, are main sources of informal support for 
their elderly parents in Asian countries (Cai et al., 2006; Cameron and Cobb-Clark, 2008; 
Nguyen et al., 2012). Among immigrants, we also observe a higher incidence of caregiving 
(by females (for non-residents) and males (for residents or non-residents)) among those 
arrived in Australia as a child, probably because they are likely to be linked with closer 
physical contact with their relatives or friends.  
We also find the probability of being the resident caregiver decreases with higher educational 
attainment (bachelor’s degree or higher). While the signs of these coefficients are consistent 
with the observation that people with higher education may tend to face higher opportunity 
costs of providing care (Norton, 2000), the results are statistically significant for males only. 
Appendix Table A6 also shows that, as compared to females living in a rented home, those 
living in an outright-owned home are more likely to provide care to residents, a finding which 
suggests that more stable housing, as measured by outright home ownership, could facilitate 
care provision for residents. 
Characteristics of co-habiting household members also correlated with the respondent’s care 
provision decisions. The probability of providing care as a resident caregiver, for instance, 
significantly increases for males and females who live together with older family members. 
As expected, caregivers who live with older household members are statistically significantly 
less likely to provide care to non-residents since they have to provide care to residents in 
need. This estimated impact is, however, statistically significant only for males.  
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We also observe that indicators of the health status of potential care recipients significantly 
affect the respondents’ care provision decisions. For both males and females, any recent 
serious injury or illness of a family member statistically significantly increases the probability 
of providing care for either residents or non-residents. By contrast, the death of a relative 
statistically significantly reduces the probability of providing care for non-residents only. The 
death of a close friend however does not have any statistically significant impact on the 
probability of providing any type of care. 
5.2. Main versus secondary caregivers 
5.2.1. Test results 
We next discuss results from dynamic models of the intensity of care provision (i.e. through 
main and secondary care provision). The main results are reported in Table 4a. The lower 
panel in Table 4a shows that the correlation coefficients are positive and highly statistically 
significant for males and females. These positive error correlations suggest that 
unobservables that increase an individual’s probability of providing care as the main 
caregiver also affect his or her probability of supplying care as a secondary caregiver, in the 
same direction. The significance of the estimates of error correlations also suggests a higher 
level of inertia of care intensity as defined by the main or secondary caregiving roles if the 
correlation between errors is ignored. This correlation of the errors also changes the statistical 
significance of some estimates for males. For example, the parameter estimate on the “main 
carer last year” variable in the secondary care regression is statistically significant (at the 5 
per cent level) in Specification I, which does not account for error correlation, to statistically 
insignificant in Specification II, which does account for the correlation of the error terms. 
Similarly, the estimate for the “secondary care last year” variable in the main care equation 
changes from being highly significant (at the 1 per cent level) to marginally significant (at the 
5 per cent level) in the regressions that control for error correlation.  
[Table 4a about here] 
The highly statistically significant estimates of error correlation also help to explain why, in 
most cases, the AIC and BIC support Specification II. An exception is observed for males (in 
Model 1) where the BIC marginally favours Specification I.  
5.2.2. Main results 
Results from the regressions with an error correlation structure (Specification II – Table 4a) 
suggest a lower propensity of transition between care intensity roles for males than for 
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females. Specifically, for females, providing care as a main (secondary) caregiver last year 
statistically significantly increases the probability of providing care as a secondary (main) 
caregiver this year. By contrast, for males, providing care as the main (secondary) caregiver 
has no statistically significant impact on the probability of supplying care as a secondary 
(main) caregiver. This is, however, the only apparent gender difference in the estimates of 
past care status on current caregiving status that we observe. For other estimates, we observe 
a similar pattern of care inertia for both males and females. Specifically, males and females 
providing care as main or secondary caregivers last year are statistically significantly more 
likely to resume those roles in the current year.28 Similarly, individuals who provided care 
(either as main or secondary caregivers) at the beginning of the study period (i.e. in 2005) are 
more likely to provide care either as main or secondary caregivers in the current year. 
Turning to the impact of previous employment status on current caregiving decisions, we also 
observe heterogeneous impacts by gender. For females, only those working on a full-time 
basis in the previous year are less likely to provide care either as main or secondary 
caregivers in the subsequent year. By contrast, for males, working on any basis (full-time, 
part-time or self-employment) in the preceding year statistically significantly reduces the 
probability of providing care as main caregivers in the subsequent year. However, males’ 
previous working states do not statistically significantly affect their subsequent decisions to 
provide care as secondary caregivers. Males who worked part-time last year are the 
exception: they are more likely to provide care as secondary caregivers in the subsequent 
year, probably as a result of an interaction between various work security, flexibility and 
benefit characteristics that we will discuss in Sub-section 5.2.3. Additionally, only working 
on a part-time or self-employed basis in the initial year (i.e. 2005) statistically significantly 
reduces males’ chance of assuming a secondary caregiver role in the subsequent year. This 
finding is likely to be due to individuals changing their employment status to full-time 
employment in the subsequent year.  
28 It is likely that switching between main and secondary caregiving roles is more feasible when individuals live 
with their partners, given that care is often provided for elderly parents and children. To test this possibility, we 
experimented with including interaction terms between one-year lags of main and secondary caregiving 
variables and the individual’s marital status and test for the statistical significance of these interaction terms. We 
use the individual’s marital status to indicate the presence of the individual’s partner because almost all married 
individuals co-reside with their partners in our sample. The results from this experiment indicate some evidence 
of such a possibility for males only. Specifically, the presence of a male individual’s partner is found to 
statistically (at the 5 % level) increase the probability of switching from the main caregiving roles last year to 
secondary roles in the current year. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggestions that led us to conduct this 
experiment. The results from this experiment are available upon request. 
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In summary, the results from two alternative classifications of care provision both confirm 
the presence of significant state-dependence in informal care provision for both males and 
females. This finding is consistent with the observation that caregivers are more likely to 
identify themselves as the main caregiver when they provide care for residents (see Table 1). 
The pattern of state-dependence from two different classifications of care provision, however, 
appears to be more similar for males than for females. Disaggregation by care intensity (i.e. 
main or secondary caregiving roles) further reveals that females providing care as main 
(secondary) caregivers last year are more likely to provide care as secondary (main) 
caregivers this year. Recall that classifying care by residency status, we did not find evidence 
that females switched from providing care to residents to providing care to non-residents, or 
vice versa. These differences in the estimates between the two care definitions for females 
may reflect the differences in the types of care recipients to whom males and females provide 
care. It is also possible that, as previously found in this literature (Lilly et al., 2010; Nguyen 
and Connelly, 2013), males and females apply different measures of care intensity. While the 
results here confirm the previous evidence of inertia in care provision, they may also suggest 
a certain level of “flexibility”, especially for females, in care provision. Specifically, 
caregivers who find it hard to exit their caregiving duties may be able to adjust the intensity 
of care by switching between the main and secondary caregiving roles. 
5.2.3. Results from alternative models with work characteristics  
Results from models with indicators of work security and flexibility (overall job satisfaction) 
perceptions are reported in Table 4b (4c). The parameter estimates for most variables are 
almost identical to those found in Model 1, as are the test statistics.  
[Table 4b and 4c about here] 
Controlling for working status, we find that work flexibility perceptions have no impact on 
workers’ subsequent care decisions (See Table 4b). By contrast, for both male and female 
workers, perceptions about job security do influence their subsequent decisions to provide 
care. It is interesting to observe that while job security perceptions influence males’ and 
females’ subsequent decisions to provide care in the same direction they take longer to have 
an impact on males’ care provision decisions. In particular, among females who worked last 
year, those who felt their jobs were more secure are less likely to provide care as main 
caregivers this year. By contrast, only males who worked in 2005 and perceived their jobs 
more secure are less likely to provide care (either as main or secondary caregivers) in the 
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current year. Our finding of a different impact of job security perceptions by time horizon for 
males and females is thus consistent with a stronger labour market attachment for males than 
females. 
Turning to the impact of overall job satisfaction perceptions on care provision decisions, we 
also find a medium-term impact for male workers. Specifically, results from Table 4c suggest 
that males who worked in 2005 and reported higher overall job satisfaction are less likely to 
provide care as main caregivers in current year. This is, however, the only statistically 
significant impact of job satisfaction perceptions that we observe in Model 3.  
5.2.4. Other results 
Consistent with the observation that caregivers are more likely to identify themselves as the 
main caregiver when they co-reside with care recipients, estimates for other variables 
(reported in Appendix Table A9) are almost the same as those found previously when care is 
distinguished by residency status. One noticeable change is that, for both males and females, 
the estimated coefficients on variables that describe the number of co-residing members of 
various age cohorts become statistically insignificant in both the main and secondary care 
equations. This is reasonable because these variables represent the characteristics of those 
who live with the caregivers and they are expected to be more closely related with the 
demand for care as defined by residency status. 
6. Conclusion 
We have examined the dynamics of care provision by working age Australians. Our 
multinominal dynamic models account for state-dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and 
initial conditions. The results provide strong evidence of positive state-dependence in all care 
provision states (defined either by residency status or main/secondary role). This is true in 
both the short- and medium-term, irrespective of gender. In addition, the persistence in care 
provision appears to be stronger for more intensive care types (i.e. resident care or main 
care).  
We also find that previous employment states have some significant deterrent impacts on 
subsequent care decisions. The employment impacts, however, vary by type of previous 
work, type of current care, and also by gender of the caregiver. In particular, for females, 
only working on a full-time basis in the preceding year reduces the subsequent probability of 
providing any type of care (defined either by residency status or intensity). By contrast, for 
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males, working on any basis last year statistically significantly reduces the subsequent 
probability that they provide more intensive care (i.e. resident or main care), only.  
Controlling for employment status, we find that workers’ perceptions about work flexibility 
or overall work satisfaction have no impact on their subsequent decisions to provide care of 
any type. This finding suggests that, contrary to popular intuition, policies that are designed 
to create flexibility in employment may actually not do much to facilitate informal care 
provision. Indeed, by contrast, we find some evidence that workers with higher job security 
perceptions are less likely to become caregivers in subsequent years. This finding implies that 
policies that are intended to strengthen the job security of workers may, in fact, discourage 
workers from providing informal care. Also, from the public policy point of view, our 
findings of significant inertia in care provision--viewed in the light of earlier evidence that 
workers with lower skills are faced with longer durations of unemployment (Pissarides, 
1992)--suggests that if returning caregivers to work is a policy goal, appropriate training 
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Resident and non-resident caregiver 
 
Female Male Total 
 
Female Male Total 
 
Female Male Total 
            Carer: % Yes 4.7 3.5 4.1 5.2 2.8 4.0 
 
9.9 6.3 8.1 
            Main carer: % Yes (a) 84.9 59.5 74.1 37.6 24.9 33.3 
 
58.6 43.4 52.7 
            Who is cared for: % (a) 
           Spouse/partner 28.6 35.0 31.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 
 
14.0 19.7 16.2 
Parents 20.1 34.2 26.1  76.7 76.1 76.5 
 
49.9 52.8 51.0 
Children 47.3 29.0 39.5  4.5 4.5 4.5 
 
24.8 18.1 22.2 
Others 4.0 1.8 3.1  18.4 19.3 18.7 
 
11.3 9.4 10.6 
Notes: Sample size: 12,348 person-years (2,058 persons) for females and 10,728 person-years (1,788 persons) for males. (a) Conditional on providing respective unpaid care. Longitudinal 
sampling weights are used. 
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 Table 2: Caregiving trajectories by gender 
 
Wave t+1 
Wave t Female  Male 








        
Non caregiver 95.5 1.7 2.8  96.7 1.4 2.0 
Residential 32.3 65.4 2.3  38.5 59.8 1.7 
Non-residential 50.2 2.0 47.8  65.0 1.9 33.1 
Total 90.1 4.7 5.2  93.7 3.5 2.8 
Panel B: Main/Secondary care Non 
caregiver 
Main Secondary  Non 
caregiver 
Main Secondary 
        
Non caregiver 95.5 2.3 2.2  96.7 1.2 2.2 
Main 35.2 54.5 10.3  39.3 50.8 9.9 
Secondary 50.8 11.7 37.5  58.1 5.2 36.7 
Total 90.1 5.7 4.1  93.7 2.7 3.6 
Notes: Sample size: 12,348 person-years (2,058 persons) for females and 10,728 person-years (1,788 persons) for males. Longitudinal sampling weights are used. Percentage of those in current 
wave state moving to the next wave state (row percentage) is reported (%). 
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Table 3a: Caregiving dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care - Model 1 with employment status (main results) 
 
Female  Male 
 


















          Resident care last year (a) 4.99*** 2.01 4.91*** 1.37 
 
3.03*** -0.40 3.08*** 0.05 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.71 5.39*** 0.46 5.39*** 
 
0.76 3.94*** 1.26 3.21*** 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 23.59*** 0.46 23.77*** 1.13 
 
27.56*** 4.17** 27.53*** 3.91** 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 1.45 15.79*** 1.71* 15.87*** 
 
4.78*** 10.39*** 4.54*** 10.62*** 
Work full time last year (b) -1.98*** -1.54** -2.00*** -1.57** 
 
-1.50** -0.05 -1.51** -0.04 
Work part time last year (b) -0.36 -0.57 -0.36 -0.59 
 
-1.38** 1.70* -1.38** 1.52* 
Self-employed last year (b) -0.15 -1.04 -0.18 -1.03 
 
-1.58** 0.56 -1.60** 0.57 
Work full time at t=1 (b) -0.80 0.84 -0.77 0.81 
 
-0.36 -0.40 -0.32 -0.30 
Work part time  at t=1 (b) -1.04* 0.61 -1.00* 0.54 
 
-1.48 -2.21** -1.44 -2.09** 
Self-employed  at t=1 (b) -1.05 -1.06 -1.00 -1.14 
 
-0.64 -1.45* -0.55 -1.35 
                   
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 2.45*** 1.73*** 2.48*** 1.70*** 
 
2.39*** 1.55*** 2.38*** 1.56*** 
 
(0.21) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14) 
 




   
-0.52*** 
   
(0.22) 
   
(0.16) 
Observations 12348 12348 
 
10728 10728 
No of persons 2058 2058 
 
1788 1788 
Log-likelihood -2846.82 -2845.98 
 
-1755.82 -1751.53 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 
 
0.03 0.03 
AIC 5969.64 5969.96 
 
3787.63 3781.06 
BIC 6993.78 7001.52 
 
4792.36 4793.07 
P LR     0.43       0.01 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; (b) Unemployed is the base group. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for 
AMEs corresponds to that of coefficient estimates. Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR test for 
the significance of the error correlation. Coefficient estimates of main and other variables are reported in Appendix Table A6.  
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Table 3b: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care – Model 2 with work security and flexibility indicators  
 
Female  Male 
 






















          Resident care last year (a) 5.58*** 2.04 5.49*** 1.61 2.84*** -0.23 2.96*** 0.26 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.71 5.15*** 0.45 5.15***  0.32 4.07*** 0.82 3.75*** 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 23.95*** -0.04 24.09*** 0.33  30.42*** 5.22*** 29.96*** 4.20** 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 0.57 16.17*** 0.52 16.19***  5.86*** 10.01*** 5.65*** 10.17*** 
Job security index last year -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03  0.17 0.06 0.17 0.06 
Work and life job satisfaction last year 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.00  0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 
Unemployed last year 0.75 0.92 0.77 0.90  1.07 -0.70 1.08 -0.69 
Job security index at t=1 0.16 -0.09 0.16 -0.08  0.00 -0.22** 0.01 -0.23** 
Work and life job satisfaction at t=1 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03  -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.02 
Unemployed at t=1 0.64 -0.22 0.61 -0.19  1.62 1.12 1.58 1.11 
                    
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 2.53*** 1.74*** 2.55*** 1.73***  2.43*** 1.56*** 2.40*** 1.48*** 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.27) (0.14)  (0.27) (0.19) (0.27) (0.18) 
Error correlation   0.18    -0.54** 
   (0.29)    (0.22) 
Observations 11988 11988  10326 10326 
No of persons 1998 1998  1721 1721 
Log-likelihood -2744.62 -2744.44  -1631.07 -1629.20 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.04 
AIC 5765.25 5766.87  3538.13 3536.40 
BIC 6785.30 6794.31  4537.59 4543.10 
P LR     0.83       0.15 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for AMEs corresponds to that of 
coefficient estimates (reported in Appendix Table A7). Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR test 
for the significance of the error correlation.  
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Table 3c: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care - Model 3 with overall work satisfaction indicator 
 
Female  Male 
 






















          Resident care last year (a) 5.71*** 2.04 5.61*** 1.62 2.88*** -0.22 3.02*** 0.22 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.70 5.12*** 0.49 5.12***  0.29 4.1*** 0.79 3.76*** 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 23.6*** -0.05 23.74*** 0.33  30.08*** 5.25*** 29.59*** 4.25** 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 0.38 16.32*** 0.47 16.22***  5.68*** 9.80*** 5.50*** 9.98*** 
Overall work satisfaction last year -0.14 0.03 -0.14 0.03  -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
Unemployed last year 0.73 0.89 0.74 0.87  1.18* -0.61 1.18* -0.60 
Overall work satisfaction at t=1 0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.10  -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 
Unemployed at t=1 0.66 -0.20 0.63 -0.18  1.41 0.85 1.39 0.84 
                    
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 2.49*** 1.75*** 2.52*** 1.74***  2.39*** 1.57*** 2.37*** 1.50*** 
 (0.25) (0.14) (0.26) (0.14)  (0.27) (0.19) (0.27) (0.18) 
Error correlation   0.17    -0.52** 
   (0.26)    (0.22) 
Observations 11988 11988  10326 10326 
No of persons 1998 1998  1721 1721 
Log-likelihood -2745.90 -2745.69  -1634.63 -1632.86 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04  0.03 0.04 
AIC 5759.79 5761.38  3537.26 3535.72 
BIC 6750.27 6759.26  4507.75 4513.45 
P LR     0.82       0.17 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for AMEs corresponds to that of 
coefficient estimates (reported in Appendix Table A8). Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR test 




Table 4a: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 1 with employment status (main results) 
 
Female  Male 
 
Specification I Specification II  Specification I Specification II 
Variables Main Secondary Main Secondary 
 Main Secondary Main Secondary 
          Main care last year (a) 7.46*** 6.88*** 5.66*** 3.00*** 
 
6.48*** 2.74** 5.53*** 1.06 
Secondary care last year (a) 8.00*** 7.56*** 4.25*** 7.22*** 
 
4.28*** 5.62*** 1.81** 5.26*** 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 18.28*** 4.08*** 21.63*** 9.85*** 
 
17.90*** 6.66*** 20.36*** 10.55*** 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 4.86*** 12.58*** 8.26*** 14.94*** 
 
2.38** 13.43*** 4.37*** 15.02*** 
Work full time last year (b) -1.98*** -1.23* -2.18*** -1.39** 
 
-2.38*** 0.63 -2.38*** 0.50 
Work part time last year (b) -0.03 -0.83 -0.22 -0.72 
 
-1.84** 2.27** -1.87** 2.13** 
Self-employed last year (b) 0.12 -1.19 -0.08 -1.05 
 
-2.44*** 1.79 -2.31*** 1.48 
Work full time at t=1 (b) 0.03 0.58 -0.18 0.25 
 
-0.54 -0.06 -0.62 -0.23 
Work part time  at t=1 (b) -1.06* 0.73 -1.15* 0.29 
 
-0.49 -2.52** -0.49 -2.71** 
Self-employed  at t=1 (b) -0.81 -0.63 -0.85 -0.79 
 
-0.28 -1.60* -0.47 -1.73** 
                    
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 1.95*** 1.40*** 2.26*** 1.00*** 
 
1.73*** 1.34*** 1.87*** 1.04*** 
 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
 




   
1.07*** 
   
(0.17) 
   
(0.26) 
Observations 12348 12348 
 
10728 10728 
No of persons 2058 2058 
 
1788 1788 
Log-likelihood -3167.67 -3146.54 
 
-1871.31 -1868.36 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 
 
0.02 0.02 
AIC 6611.33 6571.07 
 
4018.62 4014.71 
BIC 7635.46 7602.63 
 
5023.35 5026.72 
P LR     0.00       0.05 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; (b) Unemployed is the base group. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for 
AMEs corresponds to that of coefficient estimates. Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR test for 
the significance of the error correlation. Coefficient estimates of main and other variables are reported in Appendix Table A9. 
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Table 4b: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 2 with work security and flexibility indicators 
 
Female  Male 
 
Specification I Specification II  Specification I Specification II 
Variables Main Secondary Main Secondary  Main Secondary Main Secondary 
          Main care last year (a) 7.66*** 6.37*** 5.61*** 2.72*** 
 
6.57*** 3.34*** 5.07*** 1.12 
Secondary care last year  (a) 7.22*** 7.14*** 4.18*** 6.13*** 
 
4.38*** 5.93*** 1.92** 5.12*** 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 17.93*** 4.56*** 22.19*** 9.67*** 
 
19.38*** 6.38*** 22.33*** 11.88*** 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 4.76*** 13.06*** 8.89*** 15.97*** 
 
2.43** 14.85*** 4.79*** 17.19*** 
Job security index last year -0.25** 0.09 -0.26** 0.09 
 
0.17 0.10 0.19 0.12 
Work and life job satisfaction last year 0.15 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 
 
-0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
Unemployed last year 0.82 0.93 0.94* 1.02* 
 
2.48*** -1.45** 2.24*** -1.43** 
Job security index at t=1 0.11 -0.10 0.11 -0.09 
 
-0.23* -0.21* -0.22* -0.21* 
Work and life job satisfaction at t=1 -0.17 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 
0.06 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 
Unemployed at t=1 0.52 -0.49 0.51 -0.49 
 
1.20 1.13 1.50 1.60 
                   
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 1.88*** 1.43*** 2.35*** 1.17*** 
 
1.63*** 1.39*** 1.92*** 1.20*** 
 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15) 
 




   
1.06*** 
   
(0.17) 
   
(0.21) 
Observations 11988 11988 
 
10326 10326 
No of persons 1998 1998 
 
1721 1721 
Log-likelihood -3033.96 -3010.96 
 
-1755.27 -1747.50 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 
 
0.02 0.02 
AIC 6343.91 6299.92 
 
3786.54 3772.99 
BIC 7363.96 7327.36 
 
4785.99 4779.69 
P LR     0.00       0.00 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for AMEs corresponds to that of 
coefficient estimates (reported in Appendix Table A10). Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR 




Table 4c: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 3 with overall work satisfaction indicator 
 
Female  Male 
 
Specification I Specification II  Specification I Specification II 
Variables 
Main Secondary Main Secondary  Main Secondary Main Secondary 
          Main care last year (a) 7.86*** 6.48*** 5.87*** 2.82*** 6.22*** 3.38*** 4.9*** 1.15 
Secondary care last year  (a) 7.39*** 7.27*** 4.29*** 6.17***  4.31*** 6.01*** 1.89** 5.16*** 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 17.65*** 4.54*** 21.81*** 9.54***  19.75*** 6.38*** 22.42*** 11.98*** 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 4.57*** 12.89*** 8.88*** 15.83***  2.45** 14.78*** 4.8*** 17.26*** 
Overall work satisfaction last year -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08  0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.04 
Unemployed last year 0.67 1.01* 0.74 1.09*  2.66*** -1.42** 2.44*** -1.4* 
Overall work satisfaction at t=1 -0.16 0.1 -0.18 0.05  -0.34** 0.09 -0.32** 0.07 
Unemployed at t=1 0.66 -0.56 0.68 -0.55  1.02 0.87 1.27 1.28 
                    
Unobserved heterogeneity (SD) 1.85*** 1.41*** 2.28*** 1.18***  1.68*** 1.39*** 1.95*** 1.21*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15)  (0.23) (0.18) (0.27) (0.21) 
Error correlation   1.12***    1.08*** 
   (0.18)    (0.23) 
Observations 11988 11988  10326 10326 
No of persons 1998 1998  1721 1721 
Log-likelihood -3037.02 -3014.45  -1756.15 -1748.34 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04  0.02 0.03 
AIC 6342.05 6298.89  3780.29 3766.68 
BIC 7332.53 7296.77  4750.78 4744.40 
P LR     0.00       0.00 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is calculated at mean for continuous variables; for dummy variables: the AME is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. (a) Non-carer is the base group; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical significance level for AMEs corresponds to that of 
coefficient estimates. Specification I (II) does not (does) allow for correlation between errors in two care outcome equations. P (LR) is P value from an LR test for the significance of the error 
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Appendix Table A1: Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Description Female Male Total 
Caregiving status As defined in the text    
Labour market status As defined in the text    
Job security perception A number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied an individual is with the job security aspect of the job. A higher value indicates more 
satisfaction.  
8.05 7.94 7.99 
Work life flexibility perception A number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied an individual is with the job security aspect of the job. A higher value indicates more 
satisfaction.  
7.55 7.44 7.49 
Overall job satisfaction A number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied an individual is with the overall job satisfaction aspect of the job. A higher value indicates 
more satisfaction.  
7.79 7.61 7.69 
Age Age last birthday at June 30 (year) 45.77 45.98 45.87 
Immigrant from an ESB country Dummy variable: = 1 if country of birth is an English Speaking Background (ESB) country, = 0 if otherwise. ESB countries include UK, 
Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and USA. 
0.10 0.12 0.11 
Immigrant from a northwest Europe 
NESB country 
Dummy variable: = 1 if country of birth is a Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) country from the northern/western Europe, = 0 if 
otherwise. NESB countries from northern/western Europe include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
0.02 0.01 0.02 
Immigrant from a NESB country (other) Dummy variable: = 1 if country of birth is a Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) country outside the northern/western Europe, = 0 if 
otherwise. 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
Child immigrant Dummy variable: = 1 if migrated to Australia before age 19, = 0 if otherwise. 0.45 0.44 0.45 
Year 12 Dummy variable: = 1 if the highest education level achieved is Year 12, = 0 if otherwise. 0.14 0.12 0.13 
Vocational training Dummy variable: = 1 if the highest education level achieved is vocational training, = 0 if otherwise. 0.35 0.48 0.41 
Bachelor or higher Dummy variable: = 1 if the highest education level achieved is bachelor or higher, = 0 if otherwise. 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Married/de facto Dummy variable: = 1 if current marital status is married or de facto, = 0 if otherwise. 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Separated/divorced/widowed Dummy variable: = 1 if current marital status is separated/divorced/widowed, = 0 if otherwise. 0.13 0.08 0.11 
Disable Dummy variable: = 1 if has any long term health condition, disability or impairment, = 0 if otherwise. 0.21 0.20 0.20 
Non-wage household income Normalized non-wage household income ($100,000) 0.27 0.11 0.19 
Home owner without mortgage Dummy variable: = 1 if is currently paying off mortgage, = 0 if otherwise. 0.45 0.48 0.47 
Home owner with mortgage Dummy variable: = 1 if is currently owning home without mortgage, = 0 if otherwise. 0.33 0.3 0.31 
Number of persons aged 0-4 Number of people in the household in 0-4 age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.20 0.21 0.21 
Number of persons aged 5-9 Number of people in the household in 5-9 age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.23 0.22 0.23 
Number of persons aged 10-14 Number of people in the household in 10-14 age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.27 0.25 0.26 
Number of persons aged 15-23 Number of people in the household in 15-23 age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.37 0.33 0.35 
Number of persons aged 24-64 Number of people in the household in 24-64 age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.83 0.87 0.85 
Number of elderly Number of people in the household in 65+ age cohorts, excluding self (person) 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Death of close relative Dummy variable: = 1 if had a death of spouses, children or relatives last year, = 0 if otherwise. 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Death of close friend Dummy variable: = 1 if had a death of close friend last year, = 0 if otherwise. 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Injury to self Dummy variable: = 1 if had any serious personal injury/illness last year, = 0 if otherwise. 0.07 0.08 0.07 
Injury/illness of relative/family member Dummy variable: = 1 if had any serious personal injury/illness of a relative or family member last year, = 0 if otherwise. 0.18 0.14 0.16 
Notes: Sample size: 12,348 person-years (2,058 persons) for females and 10,728 person-years (1,788 persons) for males. 
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Unemployed last year  0.25 0.47 0.39 0.37 0.32 0.27 
 
0.12 0.45 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.12 
Worked full-time last year  0.37 0.15 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.36 
 
0.71 0.38 0.72 0.53 0.69 0.70 
Worked part-time last year  0.32 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.32 
 
0.06 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.06 
Self-employed last year  0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 
 
0.11 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.11 
Job security perception last year (a)  8.06 8.11 8.14 7.56 8.08 8.05 
 
7.95 7.88 7.64 7.43 7.84 7.94 
Work life flexibility perception last year (a)  7.56 7.74 7.51 7.40 7.35 7.55 
 
7.44 7.61 7.73 7.35 7.13 7.44 
Overall job satisfaction last year (a)  7.79 7.88 7.74 7.76 7.63 7.79 
 
7.61 7.43 7.85 7.57 7.55 7.61 
Age  45.45 47.48 47.41 51.52 48.98 45.77 
 
45.86 47.68 44.27 47.43 50.04 45.98 
Immigrant from an ESB country  0.10 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.10 
 
0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Immigrant from a northwest Europe NESB country  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Immigrant from a NESB country (other)  0.11 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.11 
 
0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 
Child immigrant  0.44 0.59 0.30 0.61 0.55 0.45 
 
0.43 0.79 0.83 0.90 0.51 0.44 
Year 12  0.15 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.14 
 
0.12 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.12 
Vocational training  0.35 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.48 0.35 
 
0.48 0.43 0.55 0.37 0.54 0.48 
Bachelor or higher  0.21 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.20 
 
0.20 0.07 0.12 0.24 0.21 0.19 
Married/de facto  0.77 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.77 
 
0.77 0.76 0.82 0.73 0.84 0.77 
Separated/divorced/widowed  0.13 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.13 
 
0.08 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.11 0.08 
Disable  0.20 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.25 0.21 
 
0.20 0.39 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.20 
Non-wage household income 
 
0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
 
0.11 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Home owner without mortgage 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.45 
 
0.49 0.25 0.38 0.44 0.36 0.48 
Home owner with mortgage  0.32 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.33 
 
0.29 0.48 0.36 0.32 0.45 0.30 
Number of persons aged 0-4  0.22 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.20 
 
0.21 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.21 
Number of persons aged 5-9  0.23 0.31 0.28 0.09 0.15 0.23 
 
0.22 0.12 0.38 0.12 0.14 0.22 
Number of persons aged 10-14  0.26 0.38 0.54 0.17 0.24 0.27 
 
0.25 0.22 0.55 0.19 0.18 0.25 
Number of persons aged 15-23  0.36 0.44 0.58 0.60 0.50 0.37 
 
0.33 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.35 0.33 
Number of persons aged 24-64  0.83 0.91 1.12 0.67 0.84 0.83 
 
0.87 0.89 1.21 0.72 0.87 0.87 
Number of elderly  0.06 0.19 0.38 0.14 0.03 0.07 
 
0.04 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.05 
Death of close relative  0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12 
 
0.11 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.11 
Death of close friend  0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 
 
0.09 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.09 
Injury to self  0.06 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.07 
 
0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Injury/illness of relative/family member  0.16 0.31 0.19 0.30 0.31 0.18 
 
0.13 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.14 
Weekly hours of care (b)  0.52 18.96 13.18 11.14 6.37 1.80 
 
0.29 25.96 5.19 8.04 4.66 1.11 
Carer benefit recipient  0.02 0.63 0.47 0.26 0.03 0.05 
 
0.00 0.51 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Number of wave-observations   13009 563 84 250 500 14406   11800 242 146 76 252 12516 
Notes: Longitudinal sampling weights are used. (a) Mean is for those working last year. (b) Mean is for individuals with a valid answer to the question on the number of weekly hours spent on 
providing care to a spouse or relative or parents from the self-completed questionnaire. 
39 
 
Appendix Table A3: Correlation matrix of work characteristics 
  Var. 
code 
Work security Flexibility Entitlements Overall 
 







y Per cent chance of losing job in next 12 months (a) 1 1.00 
                 
Per cent chance of voluntarily leaving job in next 12 months (a) 2 0.23 1.00 
                
Job security satisfaction (b) 3 -0.58 -0.16 1.00 
               
I have a secure future in my job  (c) 4 -0.48 -0.20 0.67 1.00 







The flexibility to balance work and non-work commitments satisfaction  (b) 5 -0.10 -0.14 0.22 0.16 1.00 
             
My working times can be flexible (c) 6 
 
-0.03 0.04 0.08 0.43 1.00 
            
I can decide when to take a break (c) 7 -0.02 
 
0.08 0.09 0.31 0.58 1.00 
           
I have a lot of choice in deciding what I do at work (c) 8 -0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.16 0.25 0.48 0.49 1.00 
          
I have a lot of freedom to decide when I do my work (c) 9 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.08 0.35 0.66 0.57 0.69 1.00 
         
Workplace entitlements: Flexible start/finish times (d) 10 0.03 
   
0.29 0.57 0.46 0.31 0.44 1.00 
        
Workplace entitlements: Home-based work (d) 11 0.02 
  
0.02 0.18 0.39 0.35 0.28 0.37 0.47 1.00 
       
Workplace entitlements: Permanent part-time work (d) 12 -0.08 -0.06 0.14 0.16 0.05           -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.14 0.14 1.00 







 Does employer provide paid sick leave 
(d) 13 -0.12 -0.09 0.16 0.17 -0.11 -0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.05 
 
0.08 0.14 1.00 
     
Does employer provide paid holiday leave (d) 14 -0.12 -0.09 0.16 0.18 -0.10 -0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.05 
 
0.08 0.14 0.96 1.00 
    
Child care facilities or subsidised child care expenses (d) 15 
  
0.02 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.03 1.00 
   
Workplace entitlements: Special leave for caring for family member (d) 16 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 0.17 
 
-0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 0.09 0.09 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.15 1.00 
  
Workplace entitlements: Paid maternity leave (d) 17 -0.07 -0.09 0.10 0.12 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 0.03 0.08 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.22 0.60 1.00 
 Over
all Overall job satisfaction (b) 18 -0.22 -0.37 0.43 0.35 0.54 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.07           
 
0.03 0.07 0.02 1.00 
Notes: Only correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are listed. Longitudinal sampling weights are used. 
(a) a number between 0 and 100; (b) a number between 0 (totally dissatisfied) and 10 (totally satisfied); (c) a number between 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree); (d) Yes/No choice, Yes = 1 
and No = 0.  
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 Variables FT PT SE 
 
FT PT SE 
 

















 Job security satisfaction (b) 8.10 7.88 7.38 
 
8.18 7.98 7.58 
 
8.06 7.39 7.27 
I have a secure future in my job  (c) 5.24 5.06 4.78 
 
5.39 5.13 5.00 
 







The flexibility to balance work and non-work commitments satisfaction  (b) 7.24 8.06 7.86 
 
7.03 8.05 8.06 
 
7.35 8.14 7.74 
My working times can be flexible (c) 3.97 4.29 5.57 
 
3.66 4.21 5.73 
 
4.12 4.67 5.49 
I can decide when to take a break (c) 4.79 4.33 5.89 
 
4.44 4.25 5.83 
 
4.96 4.75 5.92 
I have a lot of choice in deciding what I do at work (c) 3.86 3.45 5.24 
 
3.63 3.40 5.28 
 
3.98 3.72 5.22 
I have a lot of freedom to decide when I do my work (c) 3.66 3.60 5.39 
 
3.40 3.52 5.60 
 
3.80 3.99 5.29 
Workplace entitlements: Flexible start/finish times (d) 0.57 0.54 0.76 
 
0.52 0.53 0.77 
 
0.59 0.58 0.76 
Workplace entitlements: Home-based work (d) 0.28 0.20 0.46 
 
0.26 0.20 0.56 
 
0.29 0.25 0.41 
Workplace entitlements: Permanent part-time work (d) 0.76 0.85 0.42 
 
0.87 0.87 0.49 
 







 Does employer provide paid sick leave 










 Child care facilities or subsidised child care expenses (d) 0.09 0.09 0.05 
 
0.09 0.09 0.05 
 
0.10 0.09 0.04 
Workplace entitlements: Special leave for caring for family member (d) 0.84 0.71 0.30 
 
0.88 0.73 0.27 
 
0.82 0.60 0.32 
Workplace entitlements: Paid maternity leave (d) 0.65 0.48 0.07 
 
0.71 0.50 0.06 
 
0.61 0.41 0.07 
Overall Overall job satisfaction (b) 7.63 7.87 7.66   7.64 7.91 7.94   7.62 7.63 7.51 
Notes: FT: full time; PT: part time; SE: self-employed. Tests for the difference of means of full time jobs are statistically significant at the 5 % level for all variables except those given in bold. 
Longitudinal sampling weights are used. 
(a) a number between 0 and 100; (b) a number between 0 (totally dissatisfied) and 10 (totally satisfied); (c) a number between 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree); (d) Yes/No choice, Yes = 1 
and No = 0. 
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Appendix Table A5: Differences between original and selected samples 
 










Age 0.01*** 0.01***  0.01*** 0.01*** 
Immigrant from an ESB country (a) -0.01 -0.01  -0.02* -0.02* 
Immigrant from a northwest Europe NESB country (a) 0.01 0.01  -0.14*** -0.14*** 
Immigrant from a NESB country (other) (a) -0.12*** -0.12***  -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Year 12 (b) 0.01 0.01  0.05*** 0.05*** 
Vocational training (b) -0.02** -0.02**  0.04*** 0.04*** 
Bachelor or higher (b) 0.02* 0.02*  0.04*** 0.04*** 
Married/de facto (c) 0.08*** 0.08***  0.05*** 0.05*** 
Separated/divorced/widowed (c) -0.06*** -0.05***  0.02 0.02 
Disable -0.01** -0.01*  -0.02** -0.02** 
Non-wage household income -0.06*** -0.06***  -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Home owner without mortgage (d) 0.10*** 0.10***  0.12*** 0.12*** 
Home owner with mortgage (d) 0.09*** 0.09***  0.09*** 0.09*** 
Number of persons aged 0-4 0.01 0.01  0.01** 0.01** 
Number of persons aged 5-9 0.02*** 0.02***  0.03*** 0.03*** 
Number of persons aged 10-14 0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04*** 
Number of persons aged 15-23 0.04*** 0.04***  0.02*** 0.02*** 
Number of persons aged 24-64 -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.02** -0.02** 
Number of elderly -0.18*** -0.18***  -0.07*** -0.07*** 
Death of close relative -0.02** -0.02**  -0.01 -0.01 
Death of close friend -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.03** -0.03** 
Injury to self -0.04*** -0.04***  -0.04*** -0.04*** 
Injury/illness of relative/family member -0.02** -0.02**  0.00 0.00 
Resident carer (e) 0.00   0.01  
Non-resident carer (e) 0.00   0.00  
Main carer (e)  -0.01   0.01 
Secondary carer (e)  0.01   -0.00 
      
Observations 28,418 28,418  25,212 25,212 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.04 
P t test 0.97 0.63   0.92 0.82 
Notes: Results (marginal effects) are from a probit model. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of 
continuous variables. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is in our final sample and zero 
otherwise. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) denote native, no qualification, never married, renter, and non-carer as the base group, 
respectively. P t test: P value of a t test for whether caregiving variable estimates are equal to zero. The symbol 
*denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level, and ***at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A6: Caregiving dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care - Model 1 with 
employment status (Coefficient estimates) 
 
Female  Male 
 























         
Resident care last year (a) 1.91*** 0.57 1.89*** 0.40  1.50*** -0.21 1.52*** 0.03 
 (0.22) (0.39) (0.22) (0.40)  (0.29) (0.60) (0.29) (0.62) 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.39 1.27*** 0.26 1.27***  0.47 1.32*** 0.74 1.18*** 
 (0.41) (0.16) (0.41) (0.16)  (0.58) (0.25) (0.59) (0.25) 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 4.79*** 0.15 4.82*** 0.34  5.69*** 1.35** 5.69*** 1.34** 
 (0.51) (0.44) (0.51) (0.46)  (0.70) (0.62) (0.70) (0.54) 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 0.74 2.62*** 0.84* 2.62***  2.13*** 2.45*** 2.06*** 2.56*** 
 (0.51) (0.29) (0.51) (0.28)  (0.67) (0.40) (0.67) (0.39) 
Work full time last year (b) -1.17*** -0.50** -1.18*** -0.51**  -0.99** -0.03 -1.00** -0.02 
 (0.34) (0.23) (0.34) (0.23)  (0.42) (0.35) (0.42) (0.36) 
Work part time last year (b) -0.22 -0.20 -0.22 -0.20  -1.07** 0.72* -1.07** 0.68* 
 (0.27) (0.20) (0.27) (0.19)  (0.53) (0.40) (0.53) (0.41) 
Self-employed last year (b) -0.09 -0.38 -0.11 -0.37  -1.31** 0.26 -1.32** 0.28 
 (0.46) (0.36) (0.48) (0.36)  (0.56) (0.45) (0.56) (0.45) 
Work full time at t=1 (b) -0.47 0.28 -0.45 0.27  -0.24 -0.20 -0.21 -0.16 
 (0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27)  (0.59) (0.42) (0.58) (0.42) 
Work part time  at t=1 (b) -0.67* 0.19 -0.64* 0.17  -1.17 -1.44** -1.14 -1.42** 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24)  (0.86) (0.65) (0.86) (0.67) 
Self-employed  at t=1 (b) -0.70 -0.38 -0.65 -0.42  -0.47 -0.91* -0.40 -0.88 
 (0.62) (0.42) (0.67) (0.42)  (0.72) (0.53) (0.72) (0.54) 
Age -0.26 -0.02 -0.25 -0.02  -0.40 0.01 -0.38 0.01 
 (0.33) (0.25) (0.33) (0.25)  (0.40) (0.35) (0.40) (0.36) 
Age squared -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00**  0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ESB immigrant (c) -0.58 -0.51 -0.61 -0.56*  0.60 0.08 0.63 0.10 
 (0.47) (0.37) (0.47) (0.33)  (0.45) (0.35) (0.45) (0.36) 
NESB immigrant (northwest Europe) (c) -0.44 -0.11 -0.44 -0.10  0.79 0.34 0.85 0.35 
 (0.96) (0.54) (0.95) (0.55)  (1.21) (0.75) (1.20) (0.73) 
NESB immigrant (other) (c) -0.30 0.43 -0.31 0.44  0.73 0.96** 0.74 0.95** 
 (0.53) (0.35) (0.53) (0.34)  (0.65) (0.41) (0.65) (0.43) 
Child immigrant 0.44 0.75* 0.45 0.78**  1.34** 1.06** 1.31** 1.07** 
 (0.55) (0.39) (0.55) (0.38)  (0.67) (0.42) (0.66) (0.43) 
Year 12 (d) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01  -0.33 -0.25 -0.38 -0.24 
 (0.38) (0.27) (0.38) (0.26)  (0.56) (0.40) (0.56) (0.39) 
Vocational training (d) 0.05 0.33* 0.07 0.34*  -0.30 0.09 -0.34 0.08 
 (0.28) (0.18) (0.29) (0.18)  (0.34) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26) 
Bachelor or higher (d) -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04  -1.01** 0.11 -1.03** 0.11 
 (0.37) (0.24) (0.37) (0.24)  (0.49) (0.32) (0.48) (0.32) 
Married/de facto (e) -1.10 -0.63 -1.09 -0.65  -0.94 1.18 -0.97 1.23 
 (0.95) (0.77) (0.95) (0.77)  (0.96) (1.09) (0.96) (1.11) 
Separated/divorced/widowed (e) -0.59 -0.63 -0.57 -0.65  -2.33* 1.18 -2.35* 1.23 
 (1.05) (0.77) (1.05) (0.77)  (1.38) (1.09) (1.38) (1.11) 
Disable 0.35 0.31* 0.35 0.31*  -0.19 0.23 -0.19 0.23 
 (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18)  (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) 
Non-wage household income 0.23 -0.06 0.25 -0.06  0.10 0.75 0.09 0.75 
 (0.57) (0.29) (0.56) (0.29)  (0.80) (0.70) (0.80) (0.70) 
Home owner with mortgage (f) 1.14** 0.32 1.14** 0.34  0.27 -0.63* 0.27 -0.62 
 (0.45) (0.35) (0.45) (0.35)  (0.53) (0.38) (0.53) (0.38) 
Home owner without mortgage (f) 0.55 0.32 0.55 0.33  0.10 -0.65 0.10 -0.66 
 (0.48) (0.38) (0.48) (0.38)  (0.56) (0.44) (0.56) (0.44) 
Number of persons aged 0-4 0.18 -0.62** 0.17 -0.61**  0.60 -0.52 0.62* -0.58* 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)  (0.38) (0.33) (0.37) (0.34) 
Number of persons aged 5-9 0.41 -0.53** 0.40 -0.53**  0.60* 0.11 0.61* 0.10 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Number of persons aged 10-14 0.69*** -0.42** 0.69*** -0.41**  0.77*** -0.25 0.78*** -0.26 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) 
Number of persons aged 15-23 0.35* -0.14 0.35* -0.13  0.46* -0.26 0.46* -0.26 
 (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15)  (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
Number of persons aged 24-63 1.07*** -0.02 1.07*** -0.02  1.74*** -0.71* 1.75*** -0.71* 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.27)  (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) (0.40) 
Number of elderly 2.46*** -0.02 2.47*** -0.02  3.59*** -0.71* 3.64*** -0.71* 




Female  Male 
 






















Death of close relative -0.03 -0.74*** -0.04 -0.73***  -0.49* -0.40 -0.48 -0.42* 
 (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18)  (0.30) (0.25) (0.30) (0.25) 
Death of close friend 0.28 0.05 0.27 0.06  0.23 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.26) (0.19)  (0.31) (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) 
Injury to self -0.28 -0.08 -0.27 -0.09  -1.04** -0.13 -1.03** -0.14 
 (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22)  (0.41) (0.30) (0.41) (0.30) 
Injury/illness of relative/family member 0.41** 0.47*** 0.42** 0.47***  0.94*** 0.65*** 0.93*** 0.66*** 
  (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14)   (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws. Sample size: 12,348 person-years (2,058 persons) 
for females and 10,728 person-years (1,788 persons) for males. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) indicate non-carer, unemployed, native, Year 
11 or under, never married, and renter as the base group, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates on the year dummies, state dummies, local variables and the initial conditions are omitted.  
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Appendix Table A7: Caregiving dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care - Model 2 with work security and flexibility indicators (Coefficient estimates) 
 
Female  Male 
 























         
Resident care last year (a) 1.93*** 0.58 1.92*** 0.47  1.40*** -0.12 1.44*** 0.13 
 (0.24) (0.39) (0.24) (0.42)  (0.30) (0.60) (0.30) (0.63) 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.35 1.24*** 0.23 1.24***  0.20 1.37*** 0.49 1.31*** 
 (0.43) (0.17) (0.46) (0.17)  (0.65) (0.26) (0.68) (0.25) 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 4.69*** -0.01 4.72*** 0.11  5.97*** 1.60*** 5.91*** 1.40** 
 (0.56) (0.47) (0.55) (0.51)  (0.72) (0.54) (0.71) (0.55) 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 0.28 2.67*** 0.26 2.67***  2.43*** 2.43*** 2.36*** 2.48*** 
 (0.72) (0.31) (0.62) (0.30)  (0.69) (0.41) (0.67) (0.40) 
Job security index last year -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01  0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Work and life job satisfaction last year 0.08 -0.00 0.07 -0.00  0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Unemployed last year 0.38 0.29 0.39 0.29  0.66 -0.39 0.66 -0.39 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19)  (0.42) (0.36) (0.42) (0.35) 
Job security index at t=1 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03  -0.00 -0.12** 0.00 -0.12** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
Work and life job satisfaction at t=1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01  -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Unemployed at t=1 0.32 -0.08 0.31 -0.07  0.90 0.48 0.88 0.49 
  (0.32) (0.23) (0.32) (0.23)   (0.57) (0.43) (0.57) (0.42) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws; (a) indicates non-carer as the base group. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates on 
other variables are omitted.  
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Appendix Table A8: Caregiving dynamics: Resident versus non-resident care - Model 3 with overall work satisfaction indicator (Coefficient estimates) 
 
Female  Male 
 



















         
Resident care last year (a) 1.96*** 0.58 1.94*** 0.48  1.42*** -0.12 1.46*** 0.11 
 (0.23) (0.39) (0.23) (0.42)  (0.30) (0.60) (0.30) (0.63) 
Non-resident care last year (a) 0.35 1.23*** 0.24 1.23***  0.18 1.38*** 0.47 1.31*** 
 (0.43) (0.17) (0.45) (0.17)  (0.65) (0.26) (0.68) (0.26) 
Resident care at t = 1 (a) 4.62*** -0.02 4.65*** 0.11  5.90*** 1.60*** 5.82*** 1.41** 
 (0.54) (0.46) (0.54) (0.51)  (0.70) (0.54) (0.69) (0.55) 
Non-resident care at t=1 (a) 0.19 2.69*** 0.24 2.67***  2.37*** 2.39*** 2.30*** 2.44*** 
 (0.59) (0.30) (0.58) (0.30)  (0.68) (0.41) (0.67) (0.40) 
Overall work satisfaction last year -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.01  -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Unemployed last year 0.37 0.28 0.38 0.28  0.72* -0.33 0.72* -0.33 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19)  (0.41) (0.36) (0.41) (0.35) 
Overall work satisfaction at t=1 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.03  -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) 
Unemployed at t=1 0.34 -0.07 0.32 -0.06  0.85 0.40 0.83 0.40 
  (0.32) (0.23) (0.32) (0.23)   (0.56) (0.43) (0.55) (0.42) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws; (a) indicates non-carer as the base group. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates on 
other variables are omitted. 
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Appendix Table A9: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 1 with 
employment status (Remaining results) 
 
Female  Male 
 










         
Main care last year (a) 1.84*** 1.52*** 1.54*** 0.81***  2.02*** 0.95** 1.84*** 0.42 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23)  (0.31) (0.39) (0.32) (0.39) 
Secondary care last year  (a) 1.95*** 1.61*** 1.26*** 1.55***  1.54*** 1.58*** 0.79** 1.50*** 
 (0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19)  (0.35) (0.24) (0.39) (0.24) 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 3.23*** 1.04*** 3.72*** 1.92***  3.64*** 1.78*** 3.95*** 2.35*** 
 (0.33) (0.27) (0.37) (0.31)  (0.55) (0.44) (0.58) (0.49) 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 1.36*** 2.23*** 2.06*** 2.45***  0.98** 2.67*** 1.58*** 2.84*** 
 (0.35) (0.29) (0.43) (0.29)  (0.49) (0.36) (0.54) (0.37) 
Work full time last year (b) -0.77*** -0.43* -0.85*** -0.47**  -1.21*** 0.29 -1.23*** 0.23 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23)  (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) 
Work part time last year (b) -0.01 -0.30 -0.09 -0.26  -1.09** 0.85** -1.13** 0.80** 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)  (0.47) (0.38) (0.47) (0.38) 
Self-employed last year (b) 0.05 -0.48 -0.03 -0.40  -1.73*** 0.68 -1.65*** 0.57 
 (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37)  (0.49) (0.44) (0.49) (0.44) 
Work full time at t=1 (b) 0.01 0.20 -0.07 0.09  -0.28 -0.03 -0.32 -0.10 
 (0.29) (0.26) (0.31) (0.26)  (0.46) (0.39) (0.46) (0.40) 
Work part time  at t=1 (b) -0.44* 0.24 -0.48* 0.10  -0.27 -1.62** -0.27 -1.74** 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.23)  (0.60) (0.68) (0.60) (0.68) 
Self-employed  at t=1 (b) -0.33 -0.24 -0.35 -0.29  -0.15 -0.95* -0.26 -1.02** 
 (0.43) (0.40) (0.45) (0.39)  (0.56) (0.51) (0.57) (0.51) 
Age -0.19 0.05 -0.18 0.08  0.17 -0.44 0.08 -0.42 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)  (0.40) (0.31) (0.40) (0.31) 
Age squared -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00**  -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ESB immigrant (c) -0.44 -0.18 -0.65 -0.31  0.19 0.36 0.26 0.42 
 (0.38) (0.29) (0.42) (0.30)  (0.41) (0.30) (0.42) (0.30) 
NESB immigrant (northwest Europe) (c) 0.45 -0.51 0.33 -0.31  1.21 -0.24 1.04 -0.10 
 (0.57) (0.58) (0.62) (0.53)  (0.76) (0.89) (0.81) (0.89) 
NESB immigrant (other) (c) 0.32 0.23 0.25 0.24  0.74 0.92** 0.72 0.86** 
 (0.39) (0.33) (0.43) (0.33)  (0.52) (0.37) (0.53) (0.38) 
Child immigrant 0.84** 0.79** 0.86* 0.79**  0.88* 1.27*** 0.90* 1.21*** 
 (0.42) (0.36) (0.46) (0.36)  (0.53) (0.40) (0.53) (0.39) 
Year 12 (d) -0.20 0.18 -0.13 0.15  0.03 -0.49 0.08 -0.48 
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.32) (0.26)  (0.43) (0.37) (0.44) (0.36) 
Vocational training (d) -0.12 0.49*** -0.13 0.54***  -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18)  (0.28) (0.22) (0.29) (0.23) 
Bachelor or higher (d) -0.50* 0.37* -0.50* 0.33  -0.37 -0.16 -0.35 -0.28 
 (0.28) (0.22) (0.30) (0.23)  (0.40) (0.28) (0.40) (0.29) 
Married/de facto (e) -1.03 -0.39 -1.10 -0.44  1.36 -0.88 1.37 -0.88 
 (0.79) (0.77) (0.80) (0.77)  (1.01) (0.94) (0.99) (0.94) 
Separated/divorced/widowed (e) -0.68 -0.39 -0.70 -0.44  0.02 -0.88 0.03 -0.88 
 (0.87) (0.77) (0.88) (0.77)  (1.22) (0.94) (1.20) (0.94) 
Disable 0.33* 0.25 0.32* 0.28  0.15 -0.07 0.16 -0.07 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)  (0.28) (0.24) (0.28) (0.24) 
Non-wage household income 0.32 -0.42 0.31 -0.39  -0.64 1.06 -0.61 1.07* 
 (0.38) (0.31) (0.38) (0.30)  (0.77) (0.65) (0.77) (0.65) 
Home owner with mortgage (f) 0.89** 0.13 0.92** 0.23  -0.43 -0.30 -0.32 -0.32 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.35)  (0.47) (0.37) (0.48) (0.38) 
Home owner without mortgage (f) 0.67* -0.00 0.69* 0.09  -0.98* -0.05 -0.87* -0.10 
 (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38)  (0.51) (0.41) (0.51) (0.41) 
Number of persons aged 0-4 0.02 -0.47 -0.03 -0.43  0.13 -0.22 0.11 -0.23 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29)  (0.37) (0.28) (0.37) (0.28) 
Number of persons aged 5-9 0.04 -0.24 0.01 -0.20  0.18 0.26 0.19 0.26 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)  (0.34) (0.26) (0.35) (0.26) 
Number of persons aged 10-14 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.09  0.40 0.06 0.40 0.06 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)  (0.30) (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) 




Female  Male 
 






 Main Secondary Main 
Secondar
y 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)  (0.26) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) 
Number of persons aged 24-63 0.42* 0.46* 0.46* 0.49*  0.48 0.33 0.51 0.34 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)  (0.43) (0.32) (0.43) (0.32) 
Number of elderly 1.54*** 0.46* 1.56*** 0.49*  1.72*** 0.33 1.78*** 0.34 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.36) (0.26)  (0.57) (0.32) (0.57) (0.32) 
Death of close relative -0.43** -0.61*** -0.46** -0.59***  -0.38 -0.47** -0.42 -0.47** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)  (0.29) (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) 
Death of close friend 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.10  0.08 0.08 0.13 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.30) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) 
Injury to self -0.03 -0.29 -0.05 -0.29  -0.55 -0.39 -0.57 -0.40 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24)  (0.39) (0.29) (0.38) (0.29) 
Injury/illness of relative/family member 0.52*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 0.41***  0.59** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.76*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)   (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws. Sample size: 12,348 person-years (2,058 persons) 
for females and 10,728 person-years (1,788 persons) for males. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) indicate non-carer, unemployed, native, Year 
11 or under, never married, and renter as the base group, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 




Appendix Table A10: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 2 with work security and flexibility indicators (Coefficient 
estimates) 
 Female  Male  Specification I Specification II  Specification I Specification II 
Variables Main Secondary Main Secondary  Main Secondary Main Secondary 
          
Main care last year (a) 1.86*** 1.46*** 1.52*** 0.76***  2.02*** 1.08*** 1.76*** 0.44 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.23)  (0.32) (0.40) (0.32) (0.40) 
Secondary care last year  (a) 1.81*** 1.57*** 1.23*** 1.41***  1.56*** 1.61*** 0.85** 1.46*** 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19)  (0.37) (0.25) (0.37) (0.24) 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 3.17*** 1.14*** 3.78*** 1.93***  3.74*** 1.70*** 4.22*** 2.52*** 
 (0.35) (0.28) (0.38) (0.32)  (0.55) (0.49) (0.59) (0.51) 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 1.34*** 2.29*** 2.15*** 2.61***  0.99** 2.78*** 1.72*** 3.06*** 
 (0.42) (0.29) (0.42) (0.31)  (0.49) (0.37) (0.52) (0.38) 
Job security index last year -0.10** 0.03 -0.10** 0.03  0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Work and life job satisfaction last year 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.01  -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Unemployed last year 0.30 0.31 0.34* 0.33*  1.11*** -0.75** 1.04*** -0.71** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) 
Job security index at t=1 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.03  -0.12* -0.10* -0.12* -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Work and life job satisfaction at t=1 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00  0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Unemployed at t=1 0.19 -0.18 0.19 -0.18  0.55 0.44 0.69 0.59 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.23)   (0.44) (0.40) (0.46) (0.41) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws; (a) indicates non-carer as the base group. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates on 
other variables are omitted.  
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Appendix Table A11: Caregiving intensity dynamics: Main versus secondary care - Model 3 with overall work satisfaction indicator (Coefficient estimates) 
 
Female  Male 
 
Specification I Specification II  Specification I Specification II 
Variables 
Main Secondary Main Secondary  Main Secondary Main Secondary 
 
         
Main care last year (a) 1.89*** 1.47*** 1.56*** 0.79***  1.98*** 1.09*** 1.73*** 0.45 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.23)  (0.32) (0.40) (0.31) (0.40) 
Secondary care last year  (a) 1.83*** 1.58*** 1.24*** 1.41***  1.56*** 1.62*** 0.84** 1.46*** 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19)  (0.37) (0.25) (0.38) (0.24) 
Main care at t = 1 (a) 3.12*** 1.14*** 3.69*** 1.91***  3.83*** 1.70*** 4.27*** 2.53*** 
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.38) (0.32)  (0.56) (0.47) (0.60) (0.52) 
Secondary care at t=1 (a) 1.29*** 2.27*** 2.13*** 2.59***  1.02** 2.77*** 1.74*** 3.06*** 
 (0.45) (0.29) (0.43) (0.31)  (0.50) (0.37) (0.53) (0.39) 
Overall work satisfaction last year -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03  0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Unemployed last year 0.25 0.33* 0.27 0.36*  1.19*** -0.73** 1.14*** -0.69* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) 
Overall work satisfaction at t=1 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.02  -0.19** 0.04 -0.18** 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Unemployed at t=1 0.25 -0.21 0.25 -0.20  0.50 0.36 0.63 0.51 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23)   (0.44) (0.40) (0.46) (0.41) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from MSL estimation with 50 Halton draws; (a) indicates non-carer as the base group. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates on 
other variables are omitted.  
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Impact of resident care 
     Years since decision Resident care Non-resident care  Resident care Non-resident care 
1 4.91 1.37  3.08 0.05 
2 0.16 0.02  0.07 0.00 
3 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 
      
Impact of non-resident care      
Years since decision Resident care Non-resident care  Resident care Non-resident care 
1 0.46 5.39  1.26 3.21 
2 0.00 0.21  0.01 0.07 
3 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.00 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is derived from estimation 
results from Model 1 – Specification II.  
 
Appendix Table A13: Dynamic effects of main/secondary care 
 
Female  Male 
Impact of main care      
Years since decision Main Secondary  Main Secondary 
1 5.66 3.00  5.53 1.06 
2 0.23 0.07  0.19 0.01 
3 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 
      
Impact of secondary care      
Years since decision Main Secondary  Main Secondary 
1 4.25 7.22  1.81 5.26 
2 0.14 0.32  0.03 0.17 
3 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01 
Notes: Average marginal effects (AMEs), expressed in percentage points, are reported. AME is derived from estimation 
results from Model 1 – Specification II. 
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